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Abstract
In many competitive settings consumers buy multiple product categories, and some prefer
to use a single firm, generating complementary cross-category price effects. To study pricing
in supermarkets, an organizational form where these effects are internalized, we develop a
multi-category multi-seller demand model and estimate it using UK consumer data. This
class of model is used widely in theoretical analysis of retail pricing. We quantify cross-
category pricing effects and find that internalizing them substantially reduces market power.
We find that consumers inclined to one-stop (rather than multi-stop) shopping have a greater
pro-competitive impact because they generate relatively large cross-category effects.
JEL Numbers: L11: L13: L81
1 Introduction
In many competitive settings consumers buy multiple categories and find it convenient to obtain
them all from a single store, location, or firm. This shopping behavior can generate complementary
cross-category pricing effects, as an increase in the price of one category may lead a consumer to
transfer away all his category purchases. The magnitude of cross-category pricing effects depends
on shopping behavior: a consumer that prefers to purchase all categories at a single store may
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generate larger cross-category effects than a shopper willing to use multiple stores, since the latter
can easily switch stores only for the category affected by a price change and not for other categories.
Whether sellers internalize such cross-category effects depends on the organization of supply.1
In supermarket organization there is a maximal level of internalization, as a single seller sets prices
for all categories sold at the same store. In malls, streets or public market places, on the other
hand, separate categories have independent vendors—e.g. butchers for meat, bakers for bread,
etc.2 There are some cases with incomplete levels of internalization, such as stores that lease a
section of their floor space, and delegate pricing, to an independent category seller.3
It has long been recognized that the internalization of complementary pricing effects can sub-
stantially mitigate market power. In the monopoly case in Cournot (1838) a single seller of two
strictly complementary categories sets an overall Lerner index that is half as high as would arise
with two independent sellers. In oligopoly settings—where categories sold by any firm are pricing
complements because of the costs to shoppers of buying from multiple firms—internalization can
greatly intensify price competition (see Nalebuff (2000)). This is closely related to the finding from
the compatibility literature that two multi-product firms may set more competitive prices if their
products are incompatible (i.e. have infinite “shopping costs”)—so that consumers must buy only
from one firm—than when they are not (see Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Economides (1989)).
The market power of supermarkets is an issue of widespread interest. The industry’s revenues
are a large share of GDP and its behavior affects many interest groups from consumers to suppliers.
The analysis of pricing in the supermarket industry has typically been conducted at two alternative
levels. The first is the level of the individual supermarket category, e.g. breakfast cereals, alcoholic
drinks, etc., where there are concerns that prices are set inefficiently, either too high because of
market power (see Hausman et al. (1994), Nevo (2001), Villas Boas (2007), Bonnet and Dubois
(2010)), or too low because of a predatory intent or a negative consumption externality (see Griffith
et al. (2010)). The second is the level of the retailer as a whole, setting prices across a range of
categories (see for example Chevalier et al. (2003) and Smith (2004)), which is the focus of antitrust
investigations into supermarket competition (see Competition Commission [CC] (2000, 2008)) and
retail merger cases such as the proposed merger of Whole Foods and Wild Oats (considered by the
Federal Trade Commission [FTC]).4 At this level there has been much interest in the growth of large
retail firms such as Walmart and Carrefour (see Basker (2007) for a survey). Sometimes public
policy has been introduced to protect traditional forms of retail organization such as streets and
market places, which do not internalize cross-effects, by curtailing the growth of supermarkets: e.g.
in France a law (Loi Raffarin, 1996) imposed restrictions on new supermarkets for this purpose.
1A well-known example outside of retailing is the selling of component parts for an aeroplane. The proposed
GE-Honeywell merger would have resulted in a single seller of two categories (aircraft engines and avionics) and the
consequences of internalization of complementary cross-category effects was a central issue in the European Union’s
approach to the merger. See Nalebuff (2009).
2We use the term category or product category to refer to a group of similar product lines that are close
substitutes, as in these examples.
3For example, retailers such as Sears and Walmart sometimes rent out space within their stores to independent
sellers, in return for a rental payment (see Wall Street Journal Sept. 22, 2010). These arrangements are sometimes
referred to as “stores within a store” or “in-store concessions”.
4FTC v. Whole Foods Markets, Inc., 533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2008).
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For pricing analysis at each of these two levels it is important to understand the extent to which
the internalization of cross-category effects mitigates market power.
A related issue, in the supermarket industry and more generally, is whether consumers that
prefer one-stop shopping (i.e. to use a single store) constrain market power more than those that
choose multi-stop shopping (who use multiple stores). This has been an important question in
prominent antitrust investigations. One possibility is that the former—known in some contexts
as “core” or “single-homing” shoppers—have the greater pro-competitive impact, because they
generate a relatively large cross-category effect when they change store. The opposite can also
be argued, however: multi-stop shoppers may have the greater pro-competitive effect as they find
it easier to substitute any individual category between stores. In the UK’s CC inquiries into the
supermarket industry, some firms claimed that “since supermarkets could not price discriminate
[in favor of multi-stop shoppers], these other outlets collectively placed a competitive constraint on
the grocery retailer’s offer” and that multi-stop shoppers “effectively [...] determined supermarket
prices across the board.” See CC (2000, paragraph 2.31). According to one of the main firms in
the CC investigation “it was the marginal shopper—with the greatest tendency to migrate—who
determined prices” and this firm claimed that it “had a high proportion of secondary shoppers
and could not be indifferent to them in terms of its price setting.” (See CC (2000, paragraph
4.68)). In the US in the proposed Whole Foods/Wild Oats merger the parties to the proposed
merger argued that many of their customers “cross-shop” in a wide range of other firms, buying
different categories from different stores, and that these multi-stop shoppers constrain prices more
than one-stop (or core) shoppers. In these investigations the authorities had to decide whether to
focus on promoting competition between retailers that are substitutes for one-stop shoppers, or
between retailers combined by multi-stop shoppers. In both cases there was a debate as to which
consumer type constrained supermarket prices more, with implications for whether a narrow or
wide definition of the market was appropriate for competition analysis.
In this paper we have two main goals. First, we develop a multi-store multi-category model
of consumer demand that belongs to a class of models used widely in the theoretical literature to
analyze retail pricing, and estimate it using data on shopping choices at consumer-store-category
level. Recent demand models used to study retail market power have not considered cross-category
externalities, despite the prominence of this issue in the theoretical literature. Second, we use the
model to study two policy-relevant issues in retail pricing (as mentioned above): (i) the implications
of the internalization of cross-category externalities for market power and (ii) the relative impact
on market power of consumers inclined to one-stop and multi-stop shopping. We define categories
to correspond to product groups sold by traditional independent sellers of grocery products in
streets and public market places (butchers for meat, bakers for bread, etc.) in order to analyze
cross-effects that are internalized in supermarket organization but not in a well known alternative
organization of supply.
In the model each consumer decides whether to use a single store or multiple stores for their
purchases in a given shopping period. For each category a consumer makes a discrete choice of
store(s), and a continuous choice of how much to buy. There is differentiation between stores at
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two levels. The first is at individual category level: the consumer views stores as being different
for any category. We allow this differentiation to be partly vertical, reflecting differences in the
average quality of stores for any category, and partly horizontal, reflecting variation in individual
consumer preferences. The second level of differentiation is at the overall shopping level: each
consumer views the fixed costs of shopping at each store differently because of spatial variation in
consumer location. For any consumer the benefit of multi-store shopping—going to the best store
for each category—must be weighed against the fixed costs of using multiple stores. Consumers
inclined to one-stop shopping either have relatively high shopping costs or view a single store as
being the best for all categories.
There are two main econometric challenges in estimating the taste parameters that enter
category-specific demands. First, a significant number of zero expenditures are observed at cate-
gory level, so that there are binding nonnegativity constraints in the consumer’s continuous cate-
gory demand problem. Second, given that a consumer’s unobserved store-category tastes influence
both his choice of store and his category demands, the consumer’s unobserved tastes are not in-
dependent of the observed characteristics of the stores the consumer selects. To overcome these
problems we estimate the consumer’s utility parameters in a single step which jointly models both
the consumer’s nonnegativity constraints and his combined discrete-continuous choice of store and
category demand.
The estimated parameters imply complementary pricing effects between categories sold by the
same retailer. We calculate the Lerner index of market power implied by these elasticities in Nash
equilibrium, using the retailers’ first-order pricing conditions. We find that ignoring cross-category
effects and analyzing each category in isolation can result in market power being overestimated
substantially: accounting for complementary cross-category effects reduces the estimated Lerner
index by more than half for most categories and firms. To quantify the externality between product
categories (internalized by a supermarket) we compute the implicit marginal (Pigouvian) subsidy
per unit of output that must be offered to an independent category seller to ensure it does not
increase prices relative to the observed levels (set by supermarkets). We find that the externality is
about 47% of the price of the category (on average across firms and categories).5 This externality
is analogous to the “pricing pressure” concept that measures the effects of a merger, introduced
in Farrell and Shapiro (2010).6 The absolute value of our estimates are larger than standard
externality levels used to flag an adverse merger, i.e. our estimates indicate that supermarket
organization mitigates market power significantly.
To assess whether consumer types inclined (because of their taste type) to one-stop shopping
(at observed prices) have a greater competitive impact than those inclined to two-stop shopping,
5The presence of large external effects between product categories at a retail location is consistent with the
theoretical literature on multi-category sellers, as discussed in Nalebuff (2000), and supported empirically by a
study of rental payments in shopping malls in Gould et al. (2005), which found that mall owners offered large
rent subsidies to stores that generate a positive externality (by drawing consumers to the mall) for other stores in
different product areas.
6Supermarket organization (or any form of retailing in which cross-category effects are internalized) can be
interpreted as a merger of independent category sellers in a shopping location (see Beggs (1992)). This leads
to downward pricing pressure, because the categories have complementary cross-price effects, the reverse of the
standard upward pricing pressure that follows from a merger of substitutes.
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we compare the effect of a marginal price change (for one firm and one category at a time) on
the profits from each consumer group. We find that the profit from one-stop shopping types falls
and profit from two-stop shopper types increases. This implies that the former have the greater
pro-competitive impact. We find that this is a consequence of the greater cross-category effects of
one-stop shopping types. Since shopping costs are an important determinant of one-stop shopping
we also compare consumers by shopping costs and find similar results: we find that those with high
shopping cost have a greater pro-competitive impact than those with low shopping costs. This is
consistent with the approach ultimately taken by the CC and FTC in the cases mentioned above,
where the focus of the authorities was on maintaining a competitive market for shoppers inclined
to one-stop shopping.
The theoretical literature makes extensive use of a multi-store multi-category modeling frame-
work to study retail pricing. Some papers in this literature impose one-stop shopping (Stahl
(1982), Beggs (1992), Smith and Hay (2005)) while others model the multi-stop shopping deci-
sion (Klemperer (1992), Armstrong and Vickers (2010), Chen and Rey (2012)).7 The empirical
literature on retail market power—in contrast to the theoretical literature, as noted in Smith
and Thomassen (2012)—has typically not incorporated cross-category externalities. We adapt the
multi-store multi-category theoretical framework for empirical analysis. We develop a model that
is multiple-discrete-continuous, in that the consumer can choose one or more (discrete) stores and
makes a (continuous) non-negative choice of quantity for every category. We build on the existing
literature on multiple-discrete choice (see Hendel (1999), Dubé (2005), Gentzkow (2007)), and
discrete-continuous choice (see Dubin and McFadden (1984), Haneman (1984), Smith (2004)).8
Our multi-category multi-store model brings together the empirical literature that measures mar-
ket power for a single supermarket category (e.g. Nevo (2001) and Villas Boas (2007)), with
the literature on spatial competition between retail outlets in which the choice of category is not
modelled (e.g. Smith (2004), Davis (2005) and Houde (2012)). The paper also relates to an estab-
lished literature in quantitative marketing studying store choice (e.g. Bell et al (1998), Fox et al.
(2004)) and another studying multi-category demand (e.g. Chintagunta and Song (2007), Mehta
(2006)) by studying these different aspects of demand in a unified multi-store multi-category utility
framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss relevant features of the
market and the data. We discuss the model in Section 3 and estimation in Section 4. We report
estimates in Section 5 and in Section 6 we analyze supermarket pricing.
7Some papers (e.g. Lal and Matutes (1994), Lal and Rao (1997)) use this theoretical framework to study aspects
of supermarket pricing (e.g. “Hi-Lo” pricing, advertising of specific product prices, etc.) that we ignore because
they are more relevant at a product level rather than the broader category level of analysis we adopt.
8These discrete-continuous papers consider a single discrete and a single continuous choice in which zero demand
is not allowed. We generalize to allow for multiple continuous choices and we allow for zeros so that the paper is also
related to the literature on demand estimation subject to nonnegativity constraints, notably Wales and Woodland
(1982) and Kim, Allenby and Rossi (2002).
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2 The Market and the Data
Supermarkets became widespread in the US and UK in the mid 20th century. Until then broad
grocery categories had been sold by independent sellers in streets, public market places, or through
direct delivery to households. The categories used in this paper are defined to correspond approx-
imately to the products sold by these traditional vendors. They are shown in Panel B of Table
2—Bakery, Drink, Fruit & Vegetables, among others—along with indicative products in each cate-
gory.9 Thus products in the Bakery category are sold by a traditional baker, Drink in a liquor store,
Fruit & Vegetables by a greengrocer, and so on. This definition allows us to analyze cross-effects
that are internalized by supermarkets but not in a familiar alternative organization of supply.
We adopt a week as the shopping period in which the consumer plans his shopping. A weekly
shopping frequency was found in survey evidence in CC (2000, paragraph 4.77 and Appendix 4.3)
in which 982 respondents were asked the question: “How often do you carry out your main grocery
shopping?” A large majority (70%) reported a weekly frequency, with 14% less frequently and 16%
more frequently. We aggregate store choices and expenditures to the weekly level and assume that
decisions on how much to spend in each store are made for the whole week.
To analyze shopping behavior we use data from the TNS Superpanel (now run by Kantar),
which records the grocery shopping of a representative panel of households in Great Britain. Our
sample is for the three-year period October 2002 - September 2005. The data are recorded by
households, who scan the bar code of the items they purchase and record quantities bought and
stores used. The grocery items include all products in the categories listed in Table 2 including
those sold in irregular weights such as fruit, vegetables and meat. Prices of items bought are
obtained from the expenditure and quantity information that the household records, and cashier
receipts are used to confirm these prices. 26,191 households participated in the consumer panel in
the period of our data with an average of 67.6 weeks recorded per household. Demographic and
location information for each household is recorded annually. We treat the household as a single
decision-making agent and we use the term consumer to refer to this agent.
In the rest of this section we discuss the construction of the data used for estimation and provide
descriptive statistics. The model is too computationally burdensome to estimate on the full sample
of consumer-weeks and we therefore select a subsample for estimation. Furthermore we want to
maintain multiple observations per consumer in order to use the panel structure of the data. We
therefore construct a sample comprising a panel of 2000 consumers and three weeks per consumer.
We choose the three weeks for each consumer in such a way that they are spaced at quarterly
(13 week) intervals in order to avoid interdependencies between weeks for a given consumer and
we pick different sets of weeks (randomly) for each consumer, which allows us to make use of
time-series price variation across the full sample period. Further details of sample construction are
given in Appendix B where we also show that the estimation sample is representative by comparing
demographics between our sample, the full TNS sample and census data.
9Supermarkets appear to think about their product offering at a category level when determining price and
quality positions: they often define management jobs by category, and thus organize product selection and and
pricing decisions this level. (For more discussion of these points, see CC(2008), Appendix 8.1, paragraphs 10-13).
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To obtain consumer choice sets we match each consumer to stores based on the distance from
the consumer’s home. We use a store dataset from the Institute for Grocery Distribution (IGD),
which includes the postcode of all supermarket outlets in Great Britain. To compute the distance
between consumers and stores we use postcode information in the consumer and store data.10
We assume that the consumer’s choice set is made up of the nearest 30 stores to the consumer’s
home.11 The fraction of expenditure on store visits outside the nearest 30 is 1.2%. For each store
that is chosen by a consumer the TNS survey indicates the firm (e.g. ASDA, Tesco, etc.) and for
stores operated by the main firms it usually records the postcode. The postcode is known for 70%
of store choices. When it is not known we assume the consumer goes to a store (in the choice set)
operated by the firm they choose.12
We compute price indices at firm level rather than store level. This aligns with the policy of
firms in the period of the data, which is to set national prices that do not vary by store location.13
The existence of this pricing policy is helpful as we can use prices observed in any transaction
in a given week to compute each firm’s (national) weekly price index. We use the full sample
of transactions in the TNS data to compute the price indices. To compute the price indices we
aggregate over two hierarchical levels, following standard practice in price index construction (see
for example Chapter 2 in Office for National Statistics (2014)). At the lower level we compute a
price index for a series of narrowly defined product groups, listed in Appendix A (e.g. shampoo is
a product group in the Household category), using quantity from the transactions data to weight
the individual products. At the upper level we compute a price index for each category (e.g.
Household) using sales revenue from the transactions data to weight the lower-level price indices.
At both levels the weights are fixed over time to ensure that intertemporal changes in the price
index reflect changes in prices rather than composition effects in the weights; at the upper level
weights are fixed across firms so that differences between firms in the price index are driven by
prices rather than firm-specific weights, which avoids selection bias from the possibility that the
consumers selecting a particular firm have tastes that differ from the population. The weights are
computed separately for eight demographic types, depending on household size and occupational
class, to allow different types of consumers to have different price indices depending on their tastes.
The resulting prices are at a firm-category-week-demographic type level. We normalize the prices
so that the price of ASDA in week 1 for each category and demographic type is 1. To obtain
10Geographic coordinates for every postcode in Great Britain are available from the Postcode Directory, produced
by the UK’s Office for National Statistics. For each store in the IGD data we therefore have an exact location. The
location of each consumer is known at a slightly coarser level (to preserve anonymity), namely the postal sector.
We locate each consumer at the average coordinates of the residential postcodes in their postal sector (listed in the
Postcode Directory).
11The store data include all stores operated by supermarket chains. Where a chain operates more than one very
small store in any choice set—defined as having a sales area of less than 10,000 square feet we use only the nearest
of these stores to the consumer; this avoids choice sets from filling up quickly with very small stores.
12In many cases there is just one candidate store; in cases with more than one we pick one at random, using
empirical probability weights that depend on distance and store size. We use the store’s predicted probability
(conditional on choice of firm) from a reduced form multinomial logit model of store choice, estimated using the
full sample of consumers, for consumers whose store choices are known.
13“Most retailers set their prices uniformly, or mostly uniformly, across their store network [...]. Various other
facets of the retail offer, such as promotions, may also be applied uniformly, or mostly uniformly, across a retailer’s
store network” (CC (2008), para. 4.98 p. 498-501).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Demographic and Choice Set Characteristics in Estimation Sample
A: Demographic Variables (2000 consumers) Mean St. Dev.
Household size 2.77 1.33
Household Weekly Income (£) per Head 226.20 119.04
B: Choice Set Variables (180,000 consumer-week-stores: 6000 consumer-weeks×30 stores)
B1: Store Characteristics Stores Min Dist (km) Size (1000sqft) Price
Firm Type of Firm (share) Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean
ASDA Big Four 0.03 6.54 7.88 45.49 14.04 1.01
Morrison Big Four 0.06 6.41 6.80 33.31 8.78 1.06
Sainsbury Big Four 0.13 4.72 5.70 31.81 16.57 1.21
Tesco Big Four 0.17 3.61 4.56 31.44 22.43 1.10
M&S Premium 0.03 6.84 7.75 8.76 1.27 1.81
Waitrose Premium 0.04 6.58 6.36 18.71 8.27 1.39
Aldi Discounter 0.03 6.76 7.62 8.17 1.67 0.87
Lidl Discounter 0.02 10.31 10.17 9.83 3.01 0.78
Netto Discounter 0.02 8.76 9.14 6.70 1.76 0.76
Iceland Frozen 0.03 4.60 6.18 4.97 1.26 1.12
Others Small Chains 0.39 1.33 1.61 13.14 9.16 1.19
B2: Prices by Category Bakery Dairy Drink Dry Fr,Veg H’hold Meat Milk
Mean 1.15 1.21 1.10 1.15 1.30 1.08 1.13 1.13
St. Dev. 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.07
St. Dev. (within firm) 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04
Notes: The unit of observation for the statistics in Panel B is the consumer-week-store. There are 180,000
consumer-week-store observations in the choice sets: 6000 consumer-week choice sets and 30 stores per
choice set. Panel B1 presents means across 180,000 consumer-week-stores of: a firm indicator, store size
and price (mean across categories within the store), as well as the mean across 6000 consumer-weeks of the
minimum (across 30 stores) distance to a store operated by the given firm (omitting consumer-weeks where
the firm is not in the choice set). In Panel B2 the price statistics are for the 180,000 consumer-week-store
price observations for each category.
category quantities used in estimation we aggregate expenditure to the store-category-week level
for each consumer and divide by price.14 Further details of price index construction are in Appendix
C.
Table 1 presents descriptive demographic and choice set statistics for the estimation sample.
Panel A reports demographic characteristics for the 2000 consumers.15 Panels B1 and B2 present
statistics on the stores in consumer choice sets. The unit of observation for this part of the table
is the consumer-week-store: 2000 consumers, 3 weeks per consumer, and 30 stores per choice set,
14See Appendix E for a discussion of conditions that allow aggregation from product to category level.
15We use the household income variable to allow price sensitivity to depend on demographics. The TNS data
includes a rich list of discrete demographic variables but not income. The UK’s Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS)
includes a variable for gross current household income (variable p352). We estimate household income by regressing
this income variable (for years 2003-2005) on other demographic variables in the ESF that map to those in the
TNS survey, namely indicator variables for the number of cars (0, 1, 2,≥ 3), adults (1, 2,≥ 3) children (0, 1, 2,≥ 3),
household size (1, 2, ...,≥ 6), geographic region in Great Britain (10 regions), social class (6 classes as described in
Appendix C), tenure of residence (dummies for whether the home is privately owned, privately rented, or public
housing, structure of residence (detached house, semi-detached/terrace, and apartment), year, sex of the Household
Reference Person (HRP), and age of the HRP (≤24, 25-34,35-44,45-54,55-64,≥ 65) We dropped the top and bottom
1% household incomes to avoid outliers. The R2 is 0.51 and the number of observations in the regression is 17, 335.
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yielding 180,000 observations. Each consumer-week has a unique choice set because of geographic
and time differences. Panel B1 displays store characteristics by firm. We classify the firms into a
number of groups. ASDA, Morrisons, Tesco and Sainsbury are traditional supermarkets and we
refer to them as the Big Four. They operate large stores that stock a wide range of products in all
categories. M&S and Waitrose have an emphasis on high quality fresh food, and we refer to these
as Premium firms. Aldi, Lidl, Netto sell a limited range of grocery products at low prices and are
referred to as Discounters. One firm (Iceland) emphasizes frozen food but (like all the firms) it sells
all eight categories. The remaining firms (combined in the table as Others) are smaller chains that
each have a low market share (namely Co-op, Somerfield, and a group of very minor chains). The
table reports the distance from the consumer to the nearest store of each firm: consumers tend to
have shorter distances to firms that have many stores. Panel B2 presents the price information at
category level. Since category prices are normalized to 1 for ASDA in period 1, a mean category
price above 1 (e.g. 1.15 for bakery) indicates that for most weeks and firms the price is higher
than in ASDA in period 1. The within-firm standard deviation is due to price variation over time
after controlling for firm.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on shopping outcomes for the estimation sample. The
unit of observation for the table is the consumer-week: 2000 consumers and 3 weeks per consumer.
Panel A1 shows that 36% of the consumers use one store per week for all three weeks, while 17%
use multiple stores in all three weeks. The remaining 47% of consumers switch in different weeks
between using one and multiple stores. When consumers use more than one store in a given week
we note two features of the data, presented in Panels A2 and A3 respectively. First, shopping
outside the top two stores by spending is minimal (Panel A2). In our model we therefore allow
consumers to visit up to two stores per week, and the observed store choices used in estimation
are the top two stores by spending. Second, within any individual category, multi-stop shoppers
concentrate expenditure in just one store (the identity of which differs by category). Across all
consumers (whether one- or multi-stop) the share of category spending in the category’s second
store is 4% (Panel A3). Our model therefore makes the simplifying assumption that consumers
use only one store per category. Accordingly, observed category demands used in estimation are
the purchases made in the consumer’s main store for the category from the consumer’s top two
stores.
Panel B shows that a substantial proportion of consumers have zero expenditure for a given
category in a given week. This may be because consumers do not wish to purchase all categories
every week or because they buy from non-supermarket sellers (e.g. doorstep deliveries are some-
times used for milk in Great Britain). In line with this our model allows for zero expenditures in
individual categories.
Panel C illustrates how multi-stop shoppers allocate their spending between firms of different
kinds. We consider the three main types of firm introduced in Table 1—Big Four, Discounters,
and Premium. We consider the shopping choices of multi-stop shoppers that use, as their top
two stores, a Big Four store in combination with (i) a Discounter store or (ii) a Premium store.
To represent the Big Four we use ASDA and Tesco respectively. The table shows the proportion
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Shopping Outcomes in Estimation Sample
Observations: 6000 consumer-weeks (2000 consumers × 3 weeks)
A1: Use of Stores (shares sum to one) Share of consumers
One store per week for all three weeks 0.36
One store per week for two of three weeks 0.26
One store per week for one of three weeks 0.20
One store per week for none of three weeks 0.17
A2: Consumer-weeks with >1 store visits Mean St. Dev.
Expenditure share in 1st store by weekly spending (store A) 0.71 0.16
Expenditure share in 2nd store by weekly spending (store B) 0.23 0.13
A3: Share of category spending in 2nd store for category from stores (A,B) Mean St. Dev.
All consumer-weeks 0.04 0.11
Consumer-weeks with >1 store 0.10 0.15
B: Category Expenditure in 1st Store for category from stores (A,B) Expenditure (£/wk) Zeros
Category Illustrative Products Mean St. Dev. (share)
Bakery Bread, Cakes, Desserts 3.47 3.33 0.09
Dairy Cheese, Yogurt, Butter 3.33 3.27 0.17
Drink Wine, Spirits, Lager, Cola 4.91 8.20 0.31
Dry Grocery Breakfast Cereals, Confectionery, Coffee 5.68 5.24 0.10
Fruit & Vegetables Fruit and Vegetables (including frozen) 7.11 6.09 0.06
Household Pet Food, Detergents, Toilet Tissues 6.19 6.98 0.21
Meat Ready Meals, Cooked Meats, Fresh Beef 10.34 9.00 0.07
Milk Low Fat Fresh Milk, Organic Fresh Milk 1.17 1.29 0.30
All Categories 42.21 27.02 0.00
C: Category choices, Consumer-weeks with >1 store
Top two stores (A,B) Tesco/ASDA top store for category (1/0)
Bakery Drink H’hold Meat
Tesco & Discounter 0.80 0.51 0.71 0.66
Tesco & Premium 0.65 0.73 0.86 0.55
ASDA & Discounter 0.68 0.44 0.59 0.72
ASDA & Premium 0.60 0.80 0.89 0.59
Notes: Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS) Superpanel survey of consumers in Great Britain, October 2002 -
September 2005. The statistics are calculated at consumer-week level (i.e. we aggregate expenditures to
the week) for the 6000 consumer-weeks (2000 consumers and 3 weeks per consumer) used in the estimation
sample. Stores A and B referred to in the table are the consumer’s first and second stores by overall
spending in any week. In Panel B the illustrative products in each category are from TNS’s list of 269 most
granular product classifications; the full list of such products by category is shown in Appendix A. In
Panel C the (1/0) dummies take the value 1 if the consumer’s top store (by expenditure) for the category
is ASDA or Tesco where the figures displayed are averages for multi-stop shoppers whose top two stores
(by spending) are as listed the first column.
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of these shoppers that use these Big Four firms as their main store for the category. Thus for
example 80% of Tesco-Discounter shoppers select Tesco for Bakery, 49% of the same group of
shoppers select the Discounter for Drink, and so on. A pattern emerges in which the Discounter
is strong (relative to the Big Four supermarkets) in categories where products tend to be non-
perishable (e.g. Drink and Household goods), but less strong in perishable categories (e.g. Bakery
and Meat). The Premium firms have the opposite pattern: relatively strong for perishables and
relatively weak for non-perishables.
3 Utility and Demand
3.1 A Simple Multi-store Multi-category Model
We start with a simple version of the model to build intuition for the price incentives in the full
model. Suppose there are two stores A and B and each stocks three categories 1, 2 and 3.16 A
consumer has unit demand for every category, and selects a store for each one. Let the store-
category choice (A,B,A) indicate store A for 1, store B for 2 and store A for 3. There are eight
possibilities: (A,A,A), (A,A,B), . . . , (B,B,B). Let pjk denote the unit price at store j = A,B
for category k = 1, 2, 3. The consumer’s sensitivity to price is α.
Suppose utility is additively separable in categories and that a unit of category k at store j
gives a gross utility µjk. A shopping cost Γ ≥ 0 is incurred if the consumer visits both stores
(two-stop shopping) and avoided if he visits one (one-stop shopping). Thus, for example, choices
(A,A,A) and (A,B,A) respectively give the following utilities net of price:
U(A,A,A) = (µA1 − αpA1) + (µA2 − αpA2) + (µA3 − αpA3) and
U(A,B,A) = (µA1 − αpA1) + (µB2 − αpB2) + (µA3 − αpA3)− Γ.
If the consumer has no shopping cost (Γ = 0) he selects the store with the highest net utility (µjk−
αpjk) for each category, independent of the store chosen for the other categories. Alternatively, if
his shopping costs are positive (Γ > 0) his category choices are interdependent, as he may give up
the benefit of shopping around to avoid the shopping cost. This interdependence tends to generate
complementary effects between categories at the same store: a price increase for one category at
the store may induce the consumer to buy all categories from the other store.
Consumer tastes—characterized by store-category preferences µjk (for all j and k), price sen-
sitivity α, and shopping cost Γ—are heterogeneous in the population. Consumers of different
(µ, α,Γ)-type respond to a price increase in different ways, which vary in the extent of the cross-
category effects they imply. Consider a price increase at store A for category 1. Any consumer
that initially bought category 1 at store A, and is marginal in the sense that he stops buying it
there after the price increase, can be classified into one of the following four exhaustive response
16It is common in the multi-store multi-category theory literature, discussed in the introduction, to assume J = 2
and K = 2 and to define an individual consumer’s tastes as a point in a unit square. In this subsection we use
K = 3 because one of the consumer responses below, namely (2b), is impossible with K = 2.
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classes:
1. Initial one-stop shopper: (A,A,A)
(a) Drop store A for all categories: change to (B,B,B).
(b) Retain A but drop it for at least category 1: change to (B,A,A), (B,B,A) or (B,A,B).
2. Initial two-stop shopper: (A,A,B) or (A,B,B) or (A,B,A).
(a) Drop store A for all categories: change to (B,B,B).
(b) Retain store A but drop it for category 1: change to (B,A,B) or (B,B,A).
Of these four responses, (1a) has the maximal cross-category effect: consumers in this class transfer
all three categories from the store. At the other extreme, response (2b) has no cross-category effect.
The response class into which a consumer falls depends on his (µ, α,Γ)-type. Consumers with very
high shopping costs Γ, for example, are likely to fall into class (1a) as they strongly prefer to use
a single store. Consumers with strong (and varying) store preferences µjk − αpjk by category, on
the other hand, are likely to fall into (1b) and (2b) as they are not willing to transfer all their
category demands away from store A even though by doing so they would avoid shopping costs.
We can now relate the model to the two main questions we study in Section 6. First, when
margins are positive, complementarity between categories has a pro-competitive effect if it is
internalized—as is the case in supermarket organization—and the magnitude of this effect depends
on the distribution of consumer preferences (e.g. it is greater the larger is the proportion of
consumers in class (1a) relative to class (2b)).
Second, we can compare the pro-competitive effects of consumer types that choose one-stop
and two-stop shopping respectively by comparing how much each group of shoppers punishes the
supermarket for the price increase. We have just seen that, conditional on being marginal (i.e.
responding to the price change), initial one-stop shoppers tend to have larger cross-category exter-
nalities than two-stop shoppers. This does not, however, imply that one-stop shoppers penalize the
firm more than two-stop shoppers, because a relatively low proportion of one-stop shoppers may
be marginal: a one-stop shopper, unlike a two-stop shopper, cannot switch an individual category
(say category 1) between stores A and B without incurring shopping costs Γ, as he initially does
not use both stores. Whether one-stop shoppers penalize the firm more than two-stop shoppers
thus depends not just on the magnitude of the cross-category externalities per marginal shopper
but also on the proportion of each shopper group that is marginal.
3.2 Full Demand Model
We now specify the full model, which generalizes the number of stores and categories and relaxes
the unit demand and additive separability assumptions for categories. We also allow shopping costs
to depend on distances to the chosen stores. At a general level one can think of the consumer’s
weekly problem as choosing how much to purchase in each category at any store. To make the
model tractable, based on the data patterns presented in Section 2, we assume that consumers
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visit no more than two stores, use only one store per category, and only stores that are among the
thirty nearest to the consumer (denoted by the set J ).17 In Appendix D we show how, based on
these restrictions, the utility specification presented below can be derived from a general model of
quantity choice under a budget constraint.
We call the one or two stores visited by a consumer his shopping choice, which we denote by c
and write as a set: if c has two stores j and j′ then c = {j, j′} and if it has one store j then c = {j}.
Let n(c) denote the number of stores in c. The set of available shopping choices C comprises all
unordered pairs and singletons from the set of available stores J . For each shopping choice the
consumer has a shopping cost Γ(c), which depends on the number n(c) of stores in c and their
locations. Shopping costs include the financial, time, and psychological costs involved in shopping
at the stores in c.
There are K demand categories, indexed by k, at each store. For each category the consumer
selects a store j ∈ c. The store-category choices are summarized in d, a vector that lists the store
chosen from shopping choice c for each category. As an illustration suppose K = 3, as in subsection
3.1, and c = {A,B}. Then d = (A,B,A) is an example of a store-category choice. We write Dc
for the set of possible alternatives for d given shopping choice c. For each category the consumer
makes a non-negative continuous quantity choice. The quantity choices are given by the K × 1
vector q. Let p be the full vector of store-category prices pjk and µ the full vector of store-category
tastes µjk.
The consumer’s utility from shopping choice c, store-category choice d, and quantity q, at prices
p, is given by
U(c, d, q, p) = u(q, d)− αp′dq − Γ(c) + εc (1)
= (µd − αpd)′q − 0.5q′Λq − Γ(c) + εc (2)
where u(q, d) = µ′dq − 0.5q′Λq. The K × 1 vectors µd and pd collect the tastes and prices (respec-
tively) that are relevant for each category given store-category choice d. Λ is a symmetric K ×K
matrix of parameters, common across consumers.18 The first two terms in (1) are variable utility
(in terms of q): u(q, d) is gross utility from the categories bought, and p′dq is the consumer’s total
payment for them. The price sensitivity scalar α corresponds to the marginal utility of expenditure
on non-supermarket consumption (in which utility (1) is quasi-linear).
The full model has two sources of product differentiation. First, as in the simple model,
there is differentiation between stores at category level, as the consumer views stores differently
for any category (captured in the store-category taste vector µ). Second, there is differentiation
across shopping choices c at the level of fixed utility, captured in Γ(c), which now (unlike the
17These assumptions can in principle be relaxed in our framework. A relaxation of the second assumption
would allow the consumer to select two stores (each with a nonnegative quantity) for each category. This can
be accommodated by extending the quadratic utility specification to allow the number of continuous quantities
to be 2K instead of K when n(c) = 2, with extra second-order parameters that govern inter-store intra-category
substitution. This can also be accommodated in the econometric framework in Section 4. Given that category
spending in the category’s second store is low (see Section 2) we decided not to generalize in this way.
18Unlike many forms (e.g. AIDS), the quadratic is suitable for our purposes as it can naturally accommodate
zero demands at category level. Quadratic utility demand is used in Wales and Woodland (1982).
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simple model) includes spatial variation in store locations relative to the consumer. A consumer’s
(µ, α,Γ)-type fully characterizes his tastes up to εc, a iid type-1 extreme value term which is
iid across store choices and which captures any residual unobserved utility that arises from the
shopping choice. Tastes (µ, α,Γ) vary in the population of consumers; we specify how in Section
3.4.
The consumer maximizes U(c, d, q, p) by selecting c, d, and q. The shopping choice c that gives
the highest total utility net of shopping costs is obtained by solving
max
c∈C
[w(c, p)− Γ(c) + εc] (3)
where




[(µd − αpd)′q − 0.5q′Λq] (4)
is the consumer’s indirect variable utility function (i.e. the maximum variable utility from a choice
of (d, q) given shopping choice c and prices p.
The outer maximization problem in (4) determines the vector d of store-category choices. Note
that for any category the consumer always does best to select the store j ∈ c with higher linear
term in the quadratic equation (2) so that we can write the optimal store-category choices given
shopping choice c and prices p as19
d(c, p) = [d1(c, p), . . . , dK(c, p)]
= [arg max
j∈c
(µj1 − αpj1), . . . , arg max
j∈c
(µjK − αpjK)]. (5)
The inner nested maximization problem in (4) implies a system of K category demands conditional
on store-category choice vector d
q(d, p) = arg max
q∈RK≥0
[(µd − αpd)′q − 0.5q′Λq] (6)
where the consumer may choose a zero demand for any k. We write the k-the element of q(d, p)
as qk(d, p).
Thus indirect variable utility (4) is w(c, p) = (µd(c,p)−αpd(c,p))′q(c, p)−0.5q(c, p)′Λq(c, p) where
q(c, p) = q(d(c, p), p). Expressions (3), (5), and (6) give our model’s predictions of consumer
behavior.
3.3 Cross-Category Effects at Store Level
In this subsection we return to the discussion in 3.1 of how consumers respond to a price change.
To do this we aggregate across shopping choices (c) to present the consumer’s behavior at store
level (j), which is the level most relevant for thinking about a store’s pricing incentives. (We note
19Optimal d is invariant in the level of q. This follows by the absence of store-specific effects in Λ.
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that the discussion in this subsection is useful for understanding the pricing analysis of Section 6
but does not develop anything that enters our estimator.)
First consider continuous demand responses conditional on store-category choice d. If d is such
that the consumer chooses store j for category k, then the solution to the problem in (6) implies
qk(d, p) = max
[ 1
Λkk
(µjk − αpjk − 0.5Σk′ 6=kΛkk′qk′(d, p)) , 0
]
. (7)
Equation (7) illustrates how category demands respond to price (holding d constant). The diag-
onal second-order quadratic terms, i.e. Λkk for any k, scale demand and (since α is fixed across
categories) allow own-price effects to vary across categories.20 The off-diagonal second-order terms
Λkk′ determine cross-category effects between k and k′ (a positive value indicates substitutes, a
negative value complements).
We now consider the consumer’s demand for category k at the level of store j. We aggregate




{qk(d(c, p), p)× 1[j = dk(c, p)]× 1[c = arg max(w(c, p)− Γ(c) + εc)]} . (8)
This expression does not condition on the chosen c or d and hence allows both to change in response
to a price change. The right hand side of (8) therefore allows us to identify three distinct types of
consumer response that follow a marginal increase in store j’s category k price pjk: (i) an intensive
margin change in the consumer’s continuous conditional demand qk holding store-category choice
d constant; (ii) a change in the store-category choice dk for category k, holding shopping choice
c constant; and (iii) a change in shopping choice c. In the simple example in 3.1 two of these
responses were present: (ii) and (iii). Response (i) is now added because we allow for continuous
demands. As was the case in the simple example in 3.1 complementary cross-category pricing
effects are generated at store j via demand response (iii): a shopper may switch store for all
products because the increase in the price of product k. In the full model there may be further
cross-category effects via response (i) which can be of either sign depending on the off-diagonal
second-order quadratic utility parameters Λkk′ in equation (7).
3.4 Specification of Consumer Type Heterogeneity
In this subsection we specify how tastes (µ, α,Γ) vary across consumers i and weeks t. We now
introduce consumer and time subscripts.
We begin with consumer i’s taste at time t at store j for category k which is written in terms
of observed and unobserved taste-shifters:
µitjk = ξfk + β0k
(









The firm category effect ξfk is common to all consumers and may vary by firm (f) and category (k)
20The specification thus allows the demand elasticity (conditional on store-category choice d) to vary across
categories, as the slope and intercept both have a distinct parameter for each category.
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because different firms do not offer the same branded products, and because many products (e.g.
private labels) are firm-specific (see e.g. Corstjens and Lal (2000)). Variation in firm-category
strengths was suggested by the data presented in Section 2.21
The remainder of µitjk, i.e. β0k(β1hzi + . . .), allows the utility for consumer i and store j at
time t to deviate from the firm-category mean ξfk. In the interest of parsimony the parameters
(but not all of the random terms) in this component are common across categories, up to a scaling
term β0k which allows the size of the effect to vary across categories (to normalize we set β0k = 1
for k = K). Note that the scaling term allows the variance of the random utility shocks to differ
across categories.
The observable variables are: household size hzi, which allows continuous demand to be greater
for larger households, the log of the store’s floor space szj which allows larger stores to offer
greater quality (e.g. because of a better selection of products), and quarter and year dummies
Tt, which allow for seasonal and year effects.22 The remaining terms in (9) are four random
taste components (each iid N(0, 1)): a consumer effect νµi , a consumer-time effect ν
µ
it, a category-
specific effect νµik, and a store-category effect ν
µ
ijk. These are scaled by parameters (σ1, . . . , σ4).
The last of these introduces (horizontal) product differentiation at store-category level, allowing
each consumer to view stores differently for any category. Thus store-category differentiation is
partly vertical, reflecting differences in the average quality of stores for any category, and partly
horizontal, reflecting variation in individual consumer preferences. Finally note that (i) with the
exception of νµit the unobserved heterogeneity through the ν-terms in utility are constant across
time, capturing permanent unobserved effects and (ii) the first two terms (νµi and ν
µ
it) are common
across categories and hence allow for correlation in the unobserved taste shocks across categories.
The price coefficient αi is specified to allow heterogeneity in price sensitivity
αi = (α1 + α2/ (yi/hzi)) ναi (10)
where yi is household i’s income, hzi is household size. ναi is a Rayleigh(1) random shock which
introduces heterogeneity in a parsimonious way while ensuring positive price sensitivity αi > 0 for
all i, as long as α1 and α2 are positive.










where n(c) is the number of stores in c and distic = 2
∑
j∈c distij is the total distance of traveling
to each store and back. νΓi1 and νΓi2 are each iid N(0, 1).
21The main firms are listed in Table 1 in Section 2. To economize on ξ parameters we aggregate two groups of
smaller firms: the “Discounters” (Aldi, Lidl, Netto), which have a similar quality position across categories, and
the Others, which are smaller chains (namely Co-op, Somerfield, and minor chains). This results in 9 firms (or firm
groups) that have a distinct ξ for each k: ASDA, Morrison, Sainsbury, Tesco, M&S, Waitrose, Iceland, Discounters,
and Others.
22The use of a firm dummy with a store size variable to pick up the quality on offer at a store is consistent with
the following quotation from CC(2008): “Product range for many retailers is also, in large part, uniform across
stores with variations for the most part being a function of store size [...]” (para. 6.33).
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The model allows for correlation in unobserved utility between alternative shopping choices c
with stores in common through the νijk terms that enter (9), as well as through the unobserved
components of the shopping cost term (11). The idiosyncratic term (εitc) in equation (2) is iid
for each (i, t, c) combination and captures any residual unobserved utility that arises from the
shopping choice.23
Consumers are observed in our data only if they have positive expenditure in at least one
category (see Section 2). In theory it is possible for our model to predict that a consumer visits a
shopping choice c but makes zero purchases, for example as a consequence of a high price sensitivity




it). Our model is flexible enough, however, to
ensure that this happens only with a negligible probability (0.014 at our parameter estimates),
thereby closely matching what is observed in the data.
4 Estimation and empirical strategy
The full set of parameters to be estimated is θ = (θw, γ), where θw = (β, ξ, σ, α,Λ) groups the
parameters in variable utility and γ those in shopping costs. In the same way, let xwitc = (xwitj)j∈c










i )j∈c,k=1,...,K be the observables (including prices) and taste shocks in
variable utility, and (xΓitc, νΓi ) be the observables and taste shocks (excluding εitc) entering fixed
shopping costs. Finally, we define xit = (xwitc, xΓitc)c∈Cit , νit = [(νwict)c∈Cit , νΓi ], and εit = (εitc)c∈Cit .
We make use of two core demand expressions in estimation. These are based on w(c, p), d(c, p)
and q(d, p), as given in (4), (5) and (6), now with i and t subscripts added to indicate dependence
on consumers and time as described in Section 3.4. The first is the quantity demanded of category
k in store j (by i in week t) conditional on shopping choice c:
qcjk(θw, xwitc, νwitc) = qitk(dit(c, pt), pt)× 1[j = ditk(c, pt)]. (12)
Since this conditions on shopping choice, the arguments (θw, xwitc, νwitc) of this function relate to
variable utility but not shopping costs. The second demand expression is the indicator for whether
consumer i in week t chooses shopping choice c:
Ic(θ, xit, νit, εit) = 1[wit(c, pt)− Γit(c) + εitc ≥ wit(c′, pt)− Γit(c′) + εitc′ , ∀c′ ∈ Cit]. (13)
The arguments (θ, xit, νit, εit) of this function relate to both variable utility and shopping costs.
Two important issues arise when estimating the class of demand model proposed here. First,
since consumers self-select into which store to visit, and a common set of parameters and unob-
23The scale of the parameters is determined by normalizing the parameter on the random shopping cost dis-
turbance ε to unity so that it is a Type-1 Extreme Value draw. Note from (7) that conditional demands
are homogeneous of degree zero in parameters (µ, α,Λ), i.e., writing demand as a function of parameters,
q(d, p;κµ∗, κα∗, κΛ∗) = q(d, p;µ∗, α∗,Λ∗), where (µ∗, α∗,Λ∗) represents some arbitrary value. This does not, how-
ever, allow another normalization because variable utility (4) is homogeneous of degree one in the same parameters,
i.e. w(c, p;κµ∗, κα∗, κΛ∗) = κw(c, p;µ∗, α∗,Λ∗), so that their scale κ determines the relative importance of variable
utility as compared to shopping costs in the consumer shopping choice problem (3). Since we have not normalized
(µ, α,Λ) we do not need a further parameter to multiply w(c, p) in (3).
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servables drive both store and quantity choice, there is a selection issue when estimating quantity
choice (12). Secondly, corner solutions, where a consumer does not have positive demands for all
categories, occur often in the data.
We deal with the first issue by simultaneously estimating all the parameters in a framework
where store and quantity choices are jointly determined by the combination of (12) and (13).
Smith (2004) uses a similar approach in a setting with a single continuous choice. Importantly, in
our model, the variables that determine shopping choice are not the same as those that determine
quantity choice: distance enters shopping costs but is excluded from variable utility. This exclusion
restriction is helpful to identify the parameters in shopping costs separately from those in variable
utility.24
We address the second issue, zero category demands, by explicitly modeling the nonnegativity
constraints in the consumer’s category demand problem (6). For each combination of binding and
nonbinding constraints, we find the quantities that satisfy the relevant optimality conditions, and
then choose the solution that yields the maximum variable utility, wit(c, p).25 As can be seen from
(13), to form a prediction of whether c is chosen, we need to find wit(c′, p) for each c′ ∈ Cit. In
comparison to standard discrete-choice models where the utility of each alternative is a closed-form
function of the parameters, the calculation of wit(c′, p) (as the solution to a quadratic programming
problem with nonnegativity constraints) adds a new layer of computation that must be carried out
for each draw of consumer tastes.26
Our approach to the two issues (selection and corner solutions) brings together two strands
of demand modeling: (i) the discrete-continuous literature that jointly models a (discrete) store
and (continuous) category choice (but does not allow zero category demands), e.g. Dubin and
McFadden (1984) and Smith (2004), and (ii) the literature that models non-negativity constraints
explicitly (but does not consider store choices), e.g. Wales and Woodland (1982) and Kim et al.
(2002).
We estimate the model’s parameters using the generalized method of moments (GMM) rather
than maximum likelihood.27 Both methods involve calculating the probability of the consumer
making the observed shopping choice c, i.e. the expected value of (13). As discussed above, this is
computationally demanding because of the presence of corner solutions, and would be prohibitive
24We also note that distance is a strong predictor of store choice. The literature on selection models (see Moffitt
(1999)) emphasizes the importance of excluded variables that are strongly correlated with the selection outcome
(store choice in our setting) and excluded from the outcome equation (quantity choice). Distance plays the role of
such an exclusion restriction on our setting.
25For a simple example, if K = 2, there are 2K such combinations: (i) q1 > 0, q2 > 0, (ii) q1 > 0, q2 = 0, (iii)
q1 = 0, q2 > 0, (iv) q1 = q2 = 0. In each case (i)-(iii), a first-order condition implies a quantity for the nonzero
categories, e.g. µ1 − αp1 − Λ11q1 = 0 for (ii). If these quantities are all positive, this is a candidate solution. The
final step is to compare the utilities resulting from these candidate solutions as well as from case (iv). In the general
setting where K = 8, there are 28 = 256 combinations for each consumer-week/shopping choice/random draw if all
K categories are interacted in utility.




utility has a closed form: vc = xcθ. In our model, utility depends on a new level of optimization, with no closed-
form solution: vc = Γc + maxd maxq≥0[(µd − αpd)′q − 0.5q′Λq]. Thomassen (2009, 2017) uses a simpler version of
the same structure, where vc = µc + maxk[xckθ] and xck is horsepower (and price) of engine variant k of car model
c.
27The papers cited in the previous paragraph mostly use a likelihood approach. The likelihood for our model
nests the likelihoods in those papers and is derived in Appendix G.
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for more than a small number of draws of ν for each consumer. Accordingly, we use the method
of simulated moments, which has the advantage of being consistent for a fixed number of draws of
ν (see McFadden (1989), Pakes and Pollard (1989)).
A standard concern is that prices depend on unobserved factors that affect demand. To deal
with this possibility, we include fixed effects ξfk to control for market-level unobserved quality for
each firm-category combination, and time dummies to control for market-level year and quarter
effects. We believe this ensures that market-level demand shocks are included in the model, and
therefore assume that there is no dependence between price and the unobservables ν and ε.
To construct our estimator, we use (12) and (13) to form conditional expectations of choice
outcomes that we observe in the data. (We condition on the explanatory variables x, but not on
choice variables like shopping choice.) In this paragraph, to bring out the underlying structure
shared by all our moment conditions, we let Y ∗ denote any choice outcome that we use as a
dependent variable, e.g. quantity purchased of k in j within c. (For simplicity we drop subscripts.)
For each dependent variable Y ∗, we assume that its value is determined by x, ν and ε through a
known relationship that is given by our structural model evaluated at the true parameter value
θ0:28
Y ∗ = Y (θ0, x, ν, ε), (14)
ν, ε|x ∼ with known density f(ν, ε|x). (15)
In light of the discussion in the previous paragraph, we assume independence between (ν, ε) and x
so that f(ν, ε|x) = f(ν, ε).29 We can write the population conditional expectation in terms of the
model’s primitives as
Y (θ, x) = E[Y (θ, x, ν, ε)|x] =
∫ ∫
Y (θ, x, ν, ε)f(ν, ε|x)dεdν, (16)
so that the following condition, which we use for estimation, holds:30
E[Y ∗ − Y (θ0, x)|x] = 0. (17)
As we explain in more detail in subsections 4.1-4.3, we use moment conditions, all of which are of
the type (17), for a number of different dependent variables Y ∗, to construct a GMM estimator.31
For each dependent variable we use a star, as in Q∗itcjk, to indicate both a variable’s realization in
our sample and the corresponding population variable. To denote the conditional expectation (16)
given the explanatory variables, we use the variable’s symbol (without a star) and with θ and x
28 For instance, when Y ∗ is the quantity Q∗itcjk purchased of category k in store j and in shopping choice c,
Q∗itcjk = Qcjk(θ0, xit, νit, εit) = qcjk(θw0 , xwitc, νwitc)Ic(θ0, xit, νit, εit).
29We note that (14) and (15) are the type of assumptions needed to form a maximum likelihood estimator.
Therefore our GMM estimator is based on exactly the same structural assumptions that would be used for MLE.
30This is an instance of the general fact that E[y − E(y|x)|x] = 0. To see why this is true here, first note that
since f(ν, ε|x) is a density, ∫ ∫ f(ν, ε|x)dεdν = 1. Then, the left-hand side of (17) can be rewritten, using (14) and
(16), as Y (θ0, x)−
∫ ∫
Y (θ0, x)f(ν, ε|x)dεdν = Y (θ0, x)− Y (θ0, x)
∫ ∫
f(ν, ε|x)dεdν = 0.
31These are the conditional moment restrictions (22)-(24) and the unconditional moment restrictions (32)-(36)
and (41)-(42).
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as arguments, e.g. Qcjk(θ, xit). We also informally discuss the identification of the parameters in
4.1-4.3. Subsection 4.4 details how the moment conditions are combined in the estimator.
4.1 Within-period moment conditions
A distinctive feature of our data, compared to many discrete-choice applications, is that choice
sets are different for each individual consumer because of location differences. This results in
variation in store characteristics and household attributes that is useful for estimating the effects
of these variables on choice outcomes. In this subsection we discuss moment conditions that rely
primarily on this type of cross-sectional variation, while the next two subsections consider the role
of repeated choices by the same consumer.
We start by defining the three dependent variables discussed in this subsection. For each
consumer-week it, let Q∗itcjk be the quantity purchased of category k in store j and shopping choice
c. D∗itcjk equals one if that quantity is positive and zero otherwise, and I∗itc equals one if c is chosen
and zero otherwise. (For instance, if i in t visits j and no other store, then Q∗itcjk = D∗itcjk = I∗itc = 0
for all c 6= {j}.)
Before defining the conditional expectation functions (16) for the three dependent variables,
we note that the conditional expectation of (13) given (xit, νit) can be written as
Pc(θ, xit, νit) =
∫
Ic(θ, xit, νit, εit)f(εit)dεit =
exp[wit(c, pt)− Γit(c)]∑
c′∈Cit exp[wit(c′, pt)− Γit(c′)]
, (18)
by the assumption that εitc is iid type-1 extreme value for each c and independent of νit. We can
now write the conditional expectation functions as:32
Qcjk(θ, xit) =
∫
qcjk(θw, xwitc, νwitc)Pc(θ, xit, νit)f(νit)dνit (19)
Dcjk(θ, xit) =
∫
1[qcjk(θw, xwitc, νwitc) > 0]Pc(θ, xit, νit)f(νit)dνit (20)
Ic(θ, xit) =
∫
Pc(θ, xit, νit)f(νit)dνit. (21)










= 0, for k = 1, . . . , K, (23)
E
[
I∗itc − Ic(θ0, xit)|xit
]
= 0. (24)
Expressions (22)-(24) imply orthogonality conditions (between the prediction errors and functions
of the explanatory variables) that we use, by the analogy principle, to form the following empirical
32To see this for (19): Qcjk(θ, xit) =
∫ ∫
qcjk(θw, xwitc, νwitc)Ic(θ, xit, νit, εit)f(νit)f(εit)dεitdνit =∫
qcjk(θw, xwitc, νwitc)
[∫




qcjk(θw, xwitc, νwitc)Pc(θ, xit, νit)f(νit)dνit.
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itc(I∗itc − Ic(θ, xit))

. (25)
Here (and elsewhere, unless stated otherwise) the subscript t refers to the tth time period (week)
in the sample for consumer i. (As noted in Section 2 we draw three weeks at quarterly intervals for
each consumer (so that T=3) where the weeks differ across consumers.) The vectors ZQitcjk, ZDitcjk
and ZIitc are functions of the explanatory variables xit. We now discuss their components (which
are also listed in Appendix F) and explain informally how they help with the estimation of the
parameters. Parameters can be grouped according to whether they are in µ, α, Λ, or γ. We discuss
them in this order. We leave discussion of the spread parameters for unobserved heterogeneity until
the next two subsections.
Consider first the parameters in µ. The vectors ZQitcjk and ZDitcjk contain log of store size,
household size, eight firm dummies and a constant. The moments involving these variables are
particularly useful for estimating the parameters β1, β2 and the firm-category fixed effects ξfk.
Since these moments are category specific, they also contribute to the identification of the category-
specific scaling terms β0k (normalized to one for k = K). ZQitcjk also includes quarter and year time
dummies, which help with the estimation of βT .
Next consider the parameters in α and Λ, all of which relate to price effects. To estimate these
parameters we include prices in all three moments: ZQitcjk and ZDitcjk contain the price of category
k at store j and the price for each of the other categories k′ with which k has an interaction term
Λkk′ .33 In ZIitc we include the average of the store-category prices in c, i.e. Σj∈cΣkpjk/(n(c)K), and
the same average divided by the per-capita household income of consumer i. The same-category
(diagonal) terms Λkk and the price parameters α1, α2 all affect the overall price response, and to
estimate them we exploit the fact that we observe price effects both at the quantity and store-choice
levels: Λkk is estimated by observing how much less consumers buy of k when its price changes,
whereas α1 and α2 are estimated by observing how much less likely consumers are to visit a store
when its prices change.34
Now consider the cross-category terms Λkk′ . Here the price of k′ is useful. Gentzkow (2007)
discusses the challenge of separately identifying correlation in tastes and cross-category effects
33When n(c) = 1 we use the price of k′ in store j and when n(c) = 2 we use the average price of k′ in the two
stores in c.
34We see from (7)—i.e. qk = (µk − αpk)/Λkk (supposing qk > 0 and Λkk′ = 0)—that 1/Λkk scales category-k
demand. Since α is common to all categories, Λkk determines a k-specific price effect for given α1 and α2. Still, α1
and α2 determine the scale of variable utility (µ− αp)q − 0.5q′Λq, relative to shopping costs, Γ (see the discussion
in footnote 23), and are therefore identified by the changes in shopping choice associated with variation in the price
levels across alternatives c.
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(complementarity or substitutability). In our setting cross-category effects in variable utility are
driven by the cross-category terms Λkk′ .35 By contrast, correlation in the taste for categories is
determined by the variance of the overall spending shocks σ1νµi +σ2ν
µ
it. Observing that consumers
tend to demand either a lot of both k and k′ or little of both is consistent with complementarity
as well as correlation in tastes. A shock to the price of k′ is a natural experiment that allows us to
distinguish between these two possibilities: if correlation between demand for k and demand for
k′ is due entirely to correlation in unobservable tastes (large σ1, σ2), the price shock to k′ should
have no effect on the demand for k (since k′ is in this case excluded from the utility of k). On the
other hand, if there is complementarity (Λkk′ < 0), a positive price shock to k′ will reduce demand
for both k′ and k.
Finally, with a view to estimating the mean shopping cost parameters (γ11, γ21), ZIitc contains
the observable variables in the shopping cost term (11): a dummy for whether c is a two-store
shopping choice (this is also included in ZQitcjk and ZDitcjk), and the total distance of traveling to
each store and back. To further help with identification of shopping costs we also include distance
squared and the interaction of distance and the two-store dummy.
4.2 Cross-period moment conditions
We use the panel aspect of the data to estimate the spread parameters on taste shocks that are
constant across time. Ackerberg et al. (2007) discuss how first- and second-choice data (like in
Berry et al. (2004)) or repeated purchases by the same consumer (like in our data), help to pin down
the effects of unobserved and observed sources of taste heterogeneity, since both drive correlation
between choices, and cross-sectional data alone is sufficient to estimate the latter.36 Each of the
taste shocks in our model influences one observed outcome in particular, such as total spending,
store used or distance traveled. By matching the observed covariance of each such outcome across
time periods, in the same way that Berry et al. (2004, p. 74-5) “matched . . . the covariances
between the first-choice product characteristics and the second-choice product characteristics”, we
can pin down the parameter for the relevant shock.
Concretely, after taking the conditional expectation given (xit, νit), overall spending, category-
specific quantities, usage incidence of a given store j for category k, one-stop shopping, and total
35The cost of visiting multiple stores induces cross-category correlation in demands within a store, but this effect
is separately identified since distance and n(c) are observed and excluded from category utility.
36“. . . the correlation between the x-intensity of the first choice and the second choice of a given individual is
a function of both θo [parameter on unobserved heterogeneity] and the θu [parameter on observed heterogeneity]
terms, and the θo terms should be able to be estimated from only the first choice data. A similar comment can be
made for repeated choices, at least provided the utility function of the consuming unit does not change from choice
to choice.” (Ackerberg et al. (2007), p. 4193.)
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distance traveled are:
r(θ, xit, νit) = Σc∈CitΣj∈cΣKk=1ptjkqcjk(θw, xwitc, νwitc)Pc(θ, xit, νit) (26)
qk(θ, xit, νit) = Σc∈CitΣj∈cqcjk(θw, xwitc, νwitc)Pc(θ, xit, νit) (27)
djk(θ, xit, νit) = Σc∈Citj1[qcjk(θw, xwitc, νwitc) > 0]Pc(θ, xit, νit) (28)
os(θ, xit, νit) = Σc∈Cit1[n(c) = 1]Pc(θ, xit, νit) (29)
dist(θ, xit, νit) = Σc∈CitdisticPc(θ, xit, νit), (30)
where Citj in (28) is the set of shopping choices that include store j for consumer i in period t, and
ptjk is the price of category k at store j and time t. The conditional expectation, given (xit, xi(t−1)),
of the product of the respective quantities in adjacent time periods is
R(θ, xit, xi(t−1)) =
∫
r(θ, xit, νit)r(θ, xi(t−1), νi(t−1)) f(νit, νi(t−1))d(νit, νi(t−1)), (31)
and similarly for (27)-(30). For simplicity we now let f denote the joint density of (νit, νi(t−1)).
Like above, we use a star, e.g. R∗it, to indicate a given variable before taking expectations (with
respect to any unobservable). By the logic set out above, the equivalent of (17) holds for R∗it etc.
This implies the following unconditional moment conditions:37
E
[




















DIST ∗it −DIST (θ0, xit, xi(t−1))
]
= 0 (36)
Consider first condition (32), which concerns the product of overall spending in adjacent time
periods. This condition helps to identify the parameter of the shock σ1νµi that is consumer-specific
but fixed across time periods t, categories k and stores j. A large value of σ1 implies that some
consumers tend to spend more in all time periods, whereas others tend to spend less in all time
periods. Matching this covariance pins down the value of σ1.
In the same way, we estimate the spread parameters on the category-specific (σ3) and store-
category-specific (σ4) random shocks by matching the covariance between time periods of (non-
store-specific) category quantities and of store-category purchase indicators, respectively, as re-
quired by (33) and (34). Concretely, the correlation in quantity purchased of k across periods
reveals σ3 and the extent to which consumers tend to use the same store for k across time periods
reveals σ4. The spread parameters on unobserved heterogeneity in shopping cost (γ12) and distance
traveled (γ22) are identified by matching the observed and predicted covariances (between adjacent
time periods) of one-stop shopping and distance traveled, respectively.
37To see this: E[R∗it −R(θ0, xit, xi(t−1))] = E{E[R∗it −R(θ0, xit, xi(t−1))|xit, xi(t−1)]} = E{0} = 0.
23






t=2(R∗it −R(θ, xit, xi(t−1)))∑T
t=2
∑K





k=1(D∗itjk −Djk(θ, xit, xi(t−1)))∑T
t=2(OS∗it −OS(θ, xit, xi(t−1)))∑T
t=2(DIST ∗it −DIST (θ, xit, xi(t−1)))

(37)
where Jit,(t−1) = Jit∩J i(t−1) is the set of stores that are in i’s choice set in both period t and
period t− 1.
4.3 Cross-category moment conditions
We use cross-category moment conditions to distinguish between the time-invariant shock (with
spread parameter σ1) and the time-varying shock (with spread parameter σ2). Both types of shock
impact all categories. However, the time-varying shock generates correlation between spending
on k and k′ in the same period, but—contrary to the time-invariant shock—not between k in
one period and k′ in another period (see Gentzkow (2007) for a related argument). We therefore
use separate moment conditions for within-period and cross-period covariances in spending across
categories. Spending on category k, after taking the conditional expectation given (xit, νit), is
rk(θ, xit, νit) = Σc∈CitΣj∈cptjkqcjk(θw, xwitc, νwitc)Pc(θ, xit, νit). (38)
We use this to define the following conditional expectations given (xit, xi(t−1)) for the average
product between spending on k and k′ within (“in”) and across (“cr”) adjacent time periods,




rk(θ, xi(t−1), νi(t−1))rk′(θ, xi(t−1), νi(t−1))
+ rk(θ, xit, νit)rk′(θ, xit, νit)
]
f(νit, νi(t−1))d(νit, νi(t−1)) (39)




rk(θ, xi(t−1), νi(t−1))rk′(θ, xit, νit)
+ rk(θ, xit, νit)rk′(θ, xi(t−1), νi(t−1))
]
f(νit, νi(t−1))d(νit, νi(t−1)). (40)
The unconditional versions of (17) are,
E[Rin∗itkk′ −Rinkk′(θ0, xit, xi(t−1))] = 0, for k < k′ (41)
E[Rcr∗itkk′ −Rcrkk′(θ0, xit, xi(t−1))] = 0, for k < k′, (42)
where, in the same way as above, the star indicates the respective quantities ((39) and (40))











k′=k+1(Rcr∗itkk′ −Rcrkk′(θ, xit, xi(t−1)))
 . (43)
4.4 Estimation
To estimate the parameters we write g(θ) = N−1∑Ni=1 gi(θ), where gi(θ) vertically stacks the three
sets of moments g(1)i (θ), g
(2)
i (θ), and g
(3)
i (θ). The GMM estimator is
θˆ = arg min
θ
g(θ)′W−1g(θ) (44)
where the weighting matrix is the inverse of the covariance matrix W = N−1∑Ni=1 gi(θ˜)gi(θ˜)′ and
θ˜ are first-stage estimates.38
5 Estimates and Model Fit
In this section we discuss parameter estimates and model fit. We present estimates for two specifi-
cations in Table 3. As a starting point Model 1 assumes independence between product categories
in variable utility, so that the cross-category terms Λkk′ are set to zero. Model 2 relaxes this
assumption.
Panel A shows the parameters that enter the store-category taste effects µitjk as specified in
equation (9). The effect of household and store size have intuitive signs: β1 and β2 are both positive.
The spread parameters (σ1, . . . ,σ4) are precisely estimated. Panel B reports the parameters in the
matrix Λ of second-order terms in quadratic utility. The diagonal parameters Λkk are all positive
so that own-price effects are negative. The off-diagonal parameters Λkk′ (in Model 2) are also
positive, which implies that categories are intrinsic substitutes (i.e. substitutes in terms of the
variable utility function), but the estimated parameters are small and insignificant for three of the
five parameters. In the interest of parsimony we estimate only the interaction parameters that
we believed a priori to be the most important. (In Section 6.6 we discuss results from a model
with alternative interactions and we find that our main results are robust to this alternative). The
parameters in the price sensitivity coefficient (10), reported in Panel C, are of the expected sign:
α1 and α2 are positive so that consumers prefer lower prices and price sensitivity is decreasing in
per capita household income. Finally, Panel D reports the parameters γ that enter the consumer’s
shopping costs Γ(c). The mean and spread parameters for both shopping cost variables are precisely
estimated.
38We first obtain preliminary estimates by using only the moments g(1)i , with the inverse of the covariance of




i)−1 evaluated at these preliminary estimates is the
weighting matrix used to obtain the first-stage estimates θ˜. We use a simple frequency simulator with one draw per
observation (consumer) and a standard estimator for the asymptotic variance of θˆ (see Wooldridge (2001), p. 527,
eq. 14.14). To correct for simulation noise we multiply this variance by a factor of 1 + 1r = 2, where r = 1 is the
number of simulation draws per observation (see McFadden (1989), p. 1006).
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Table 3: Estimated Parameters
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
A: Store-category Taste Effects
Bakery β01 2.374 0.074 2.085 0.037
Dairy β02 1.643 0.032 1.418 0.106
Drink β03 0.943 0.016 1.096 0.013
Dry Grocery β04 2.063 0.067 1.901 0.105
Fruit & vegetable β05 2.968 0.100 2.665 0.192
Household goods β06 1.252 0.022 1.115 0.028
Meat β07 2.733 0.128 2.309 0.135
ln(floor space) β1 0.425 0.005 0.456 0.006
Household size β2 0.383 0.008 0.477 0.024
Year & Quarter effects Yes Yes
Scale of Taste Shocks (ν):
Fixed across category/store σ1 0.197 0.024 0.208 0.012
Time-varying σ2 0.790 0.019 0.920 0.046
Category specific σ3 0.748 0.017 0.677 0.023
Store/category specific σ4 1.033 0.019 1.129 0.015
Firm-Category effects ξfk Yes Yes
B: Second-Order Quadratic Parameters Λkk′
Bakery Λ11 22.209 1.127 19.852 2.090
Dairy Λ22 12.308 0.383 11.239 1.404
Drink Λ33 3.261 0.173 3.802 0.192
Dry Grocery Λ44 11.332 0.582 10.536 0.916
Fruit & vegetable Λ55 16.113 0.739 15.952 2.138
Household goods Λ66 4.387 0.163 4.360 0.219
Meat Λ77 9.882 0.613 8.901 0.883
Milk Λ88 14.081 0.330 14.062 1.257
Drink - Dry Grocery Λ57 – – 1.742 0.163
Milk - Dairy Λ18 – – 1.368 0.555
Bakery - Fruit & Veg Λ23 – – 0.269 0.890
Bakery-Meat Λ23 – – 0.572 0.363
Fruit & Veg - Meat Λ23 – – 0.076 0.926
C: Price Parameters
Constant α1 1.936 0.047 1.839 0.037
1/[Weekly Income (£) per Head] α2 18.345 3.046 32.881 3.702
D: Shopping Costs
Two Store Dummy γ11 9.665 1.385 7.528 0.917
Standard Deviation γ12 14.375 2.553 10.269 1.657
Distance γ21 0.430 0.026 0.440 0.027
Standard Deviation γ22 0.396 0.030 0.394 0.028
Notes: Parameters are estimated by GMM using 6000 consumer-week observations. Standard errors
are corrected for simulation noise as detailed in Section 4. Year, quarter, and firm-category fixed
effects are not reported.
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Table 4: In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Fit
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Quantity Shoppers Quantity Shoppers
A: Correlation between predicted & observed demands
ρ(Qfk, Q∗fk),ρ(Dfk, D∗fk) 0.994 0.994 0.986 0.991
B: Mean absolute prediction errors
B1: Firm share of category demand (all firms and categories)
|sfk − s∗fk| 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.009
B2: 1-stop shopper share of category demand (all categories)
|s1ss,k − s∗1ss,k| 0.004 0.020 0.007 0.028
C: Firm-Level Demand Market shares of Firms
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Revenues Shoppers Revenues Shoppers
Pred Obs Pred Obs Pred Obs Pred Obs
ASDA 0.209 0.214 0.180 0.170 0.204 0.230 0.177 0.176
Morrisons 0.128 0.113 0.115 0.096 0.134 0.111 0.117 0.092
Sainsbury 0.159 0.153 0.127 0.127 0.157 0.152 0.128 0.123
Tesco 0.327 0.329 0.266 0.256 0.315 0.317 0.256 0.255
M&S 0.005 0.011 0.009 0.026 0.007 0.012 0.010 0.029
Waitrose 0.021 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.021
Iceland 0.008 0.015 0.026 0.036 0.012 0.017 0.030 0.035
Discounter 0.025 0.029 0.052 0.055 0.031 0.028 0.056 0.053
Other 0.118 0.120 0.207 0.214 0.123 0.115 0.210 0.216
Notes: In-sample predictions use the estimation sample of 6000 consumer-weeks (and the taste draws) used in
estimation. Out-of-sample statistics use a new sample of 6000 consumer-weeks and new taste draws. Panel A:
Correlation coefficients are for number of firm-category shoppers Dfk and quantities Qfk. Correlation statistics
are for the 72 firm-category predictions. Panel B: Mean absolute prediction errors are given by |s− s∗| where s
is predicted and s∗ is observed market shares as defined in text. B1 uses 72 firm-category market shares while B2
uses 8 category shares (the proportion of 1-stop shoppers in category demand). Panel C: All columns sum to 1.
Model 1 is a restricted version of Model 2, in which the five off-diagonal elements of Λ are all
set to zero. We reject this restriction at a significance level of less than 1%. (The χ25-distributed
GMM distance statistic comparing Model 1 and Model 2 is 19.2). We use Model 2 as the baseline
model for the results in Section 6. In the rest of this section we discuss the fit of this model.
The model generates choice outcomes at three levels: continuous and discrete demands at
store-category level and a discrete choice of store(s) at the shopping choice level. In the rest of
this section we check the fit of the model to ensure it is flexible enough to match these choice
predictions accurately. For example firm-specific taste parameters appear only in variable utility
(entering as firm-category effects ξfk) and they serve the joint purpose of fitting (continuous and
discrete) category demands for each firm, and discrete shopping choices that include stores of
each firm, so it is informative to check whether the model fits the data at these different levels.
Along with the in-sample fit on the estimation sample of 6000 consumer-weeks, we consider the
out-of-sample fit on a validation sample of 6000 consumer-weeks (with new random taste draws).
We begin at the category level. To check the fit of both demand intensity and demand incidence
we consider a continuous and a discrete measure of category demand. The continuous prediction
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Figure 1: Predicted and Observed Category Market Shares (in terms of Shoppers)
Notes: This figure shows observed (+) and predicted (o) market shares by category in terms of shoppers using the
6000 consumer-weeks in the estimation sample (and their taste draws).
Table 5: Observed and Predicted Market Shares by Firm Pair
ASDA Morr Sains Tesco M&S Wait Icel Disc Other
ASDA Pred 0.144 0.011 0.011 0.024 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.025
Obs 0.131 0.012 0.012 0.022 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.011 0.029
Morrisons Pred 0.087 0.008 0.017 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.016
Obs 0.073 0.004 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.018
Sainsbury Pred 0.098 0.023 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.014
Obs 0.088 0.027 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.021
Tesco Pred 0.209 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.045
Obs 0.206 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.013 0.045
M&S Pred 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Obs 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004
Waitrose Pred 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.003
Obs 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.003
Iceland Pred 0.013 0.001 0.004
Obs 0.008 0.004 0.011




Notes: Predicted and observed market shares (in terms of shoppers) for each firm pair. The diagonal
shows the proportion of consumers using the indicated firm only. Predictions and observations are for the
6000 consumer-weeks (and taste draws) used in estimation.
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at the firm category level, given estimated parameters θˆ, is the total quantity of category k sold
by the firm, i.e.
Qfk(p) = ΣNi=1ΣTt=1Σj∈JfΣc∈CitjQcjk(θˆ, xit) (45)
where Qcjk(θˆ, xit) is i’s category demand at store j in shopping choice c defined in (19). The
innermost sum is over the set Citj of shopping choices c that include store j. Jf is the set of stores
owned by firm f . The discrete demand measure, which we refer to as the number of shoppers, is
the total number of consumers who buy a positive quantity of category k from firm f , i.e.
Dfk(p) = ΣNi=1ΣTt=1Σj∈JfΣc∈CitjDcjk(θˆ, xit) (46)
where Dcjk(θˆ, xit) is the probability consumer i buys a positive quantity of k in store j in shopping
choice c, defined in (20).
Panel A of Table 4 presents correlation coefficients which show that the predicted and observed
firm-category demands from the model are highly correlated. This is also true for the out-of-sample
predictions. A high correlation is found both for the discrete and the continuous demand measures.
Panel B of Table 4 checks how close the observed and predicted demands are to each other. In
B1 we consider how well the model predicts each firm f ’s share of category k, written sfk, in terms
of quantities (Qfk(p)/Σf ′Qf ′k(p)) and shoppers (Dfk(p)/Σf ′Df ′k(p)). The absolute prediction error
is the magnitude of the difference between the predicted and observed shares. There are 72 such
prediction errors - one for each firm and category combination. We find that the average of these
prediction errors is 0.008 for in-sample predictions (for both quantities and shoppers)—i.e. on
average a firm’s market share is predicted to be within about one percentage point of its observed
value. A similarly small error is found for out-of-sample predictions. Figure 1 visualizes the
predicted and observed market shares sfk of each category for each firm in terms of number of
shoppers (for the estimation sample).
The consumer’s category demand is associated with a shopping choice c which may have either
one or two stores. Substitution patterns between categories depend on this dimension of the
model, as we saw in section 3.1. We therefore check the proportion of demand in each category
from one-stop shopping choices, written s1ssk , in terms of quantities (ΣfQ1ssfk /ΣfQfk) and shoppers
(ΣfD1ssfk /ΣfDfk). There are 8 such prediction errors: one for each category. Panel B2 of Table
4 shows that the average of these prediction errors is 0.004 in terms of quantities and 0.020 in
terms of shoppers for in-sample predictions. A similar level of fit is found for the out-of-sample
predictions.
Panel C of Table 4 moves from the category level to the firm level and considers the aggregate
(across categories) market shares for the main firms in the market. This allows us to check that
the model predicts the market share accurately for each firm both in-sample and out-of-sample.
We now check how well the model predicts some other aspects of the shopping choices c. Table
5 looks at the in-sample fit for the market share of each possible combination of firms. Note that
there is no direct parameter to capture this (like a “firm pair” dummy), so it is interesting to see
whether the model fits this aspect of the data well. The diagonal gives the proportion of shoppers
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Figure 2: Predicted and Observed Distances
Notes: The graphs display histograms of predicted (left) and observed (right) total shopping distances traveled (to
and from stores) in kilometers for the 6000 consumer-weeks (and taste draws) used in estimation. The height of
each bar is the relative number of observations (number of observations in bin / total number of observations). The
sum of the bar heights is 1.
that shop only at one firm and the upper triangle gives the proportion that combine each pair of
firms. Finally we provide a visual check of the spatial fit of the model. Figure 2 presents histograms
of observed and predicted total shopping travel distances (to and from consumers’ chosen stores)
for the 6000 consumer-weeks in the estimation sample. The histograms indicate that relatively
few travel more than 30km to and from their home. As well as being consistent with the observed
data, these predictions are consistent with external survey evidence from CC (2000, 4.129), which
found 91% of shoppers had a travel time of 20 minutes or less to their supermarket—a distance of
about 15km (30km to and from) at standard driving speeds of 45km/hour.
6 Analysis of Supermarket Pricing
We now use the estimated model to analyze supermarket pricing. We first outline the pricing
problem under two alternative organizational assumptions: supermarket pricing and independent
category sellers. In 6.2 we report the own- and cross-category demand elasticities implied by the
estimated parameters. In 6.3 we solve for the Nash equilibrium profit margins implied under the
alternative organizational assumptions and compare them to external data on profit margins. We
find that supermarket pricing fits the external data better. In the rest of the section we assume
supermarket pricing and consider the two main policy-relevant questions of interest: we measure
cross-category externalities and discuss their impact on market power, and we compare the impact
of one-stop and two-stop shopper types on firms’ pricing incentives.
Throughout this section we use the model’s predictions of firm-category demands in a given
week
Qfk(p) = ΣNi=1Σj∈JfΣc∈CitjQcjk(θˆ, xit) (47)
for the N consumers in the estimation sample, where Qcjk(θˆ, xit) is given by (19), and Citj is the
set of shopping choice alternatives that include store j.39 As we use only one period we suppress
the t subscript in the rest of this section.
39 For all consumers t is week 78 (the midpoint of the 156-week sample period). We use the same taste draws as
in estimation. If week 78 is not in the estimation sample for consumer i we draw a new time-specific taste νµit.
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6.1 Supermarket Pricing and Equilibrium Profit Margins
We compare two forms of organization: supermarkets, which set prices to maximize profit across








for k = 1, . . . , K. Here pfk is the firm’s (national) price and mcfk the marginal cost. (The firms
have a policy of national rather than storewise pricing, see footnote 13).
We assume Nash equilibrium prices, which implies the following set of first-order conditions for















where χf is 1 for supermarket pricing and 0 for independent category sellers. This condition states
that the marginal benefit of inducing an extra unit of demand for category k (by means of a
price change)—i.e. the marginal revenue mrfk plus the marginal externality on other categories
mefk—is equal to marginal cost mcfk. Note that the marginal externality imposed on any category







which is the change in category k′ demand at firm f for every unit of demand it loses on category
k as a result of an increase in pfk. Letting pifk = Qfk(p)(pfk −mcfk) and dividing (48) by price












This shows the relationship between market power and the cross-category externality: an inde-
pendent category seller has a Lerner index that is equal to the inverse of its own-price elasticity,
while a supermarket’s Lerner index is lower than this by the extent of the marginal externality (as
a proportion of pfk).40
40In Appendix H.1 we derive (50) from product-level first-order conditions. In Appendix H.2 we show how group-
specific prices (discussed in Section 2) result in the same expression as in (50) where pfk is a weighted average of
the group-specific prices. For simplicity we ignore group specific prices in the notation in this section.
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6.2 Estimated Own- and Cross-Category Elasticities
The elasticities implied by the estimates are presented in Table 6 for six categories and three firms.
The table consists of nine blocks of 6 × 6 sub-matrices. The three 6 × 6 within-firm elasticity
matrices, along the principal block diagonal of the overall matrix, give own- and cross-elasticities
for the categories of a given firm. Note that all the elasticities in these blocks are negative, so
that any pair of categories at the same firm are pricing complements. This in turn implies that
the diversion ratio (49) and the cross-category externality in (48) are positive. Some categories
(e.g. meat) generate a much larger cross-elasticity than others (e.g. milk), which is likely to be a
consequence of their relative size in the consumer’s budget.
To decompose the cross-category complementarity effects into the consumer’s discrete and
continuous responses, Table 7 presents the 3 × 3 submatrix of overall cross-category within-firm
elasticities (for two firms, ASDA and Tesco) alongside the corresponding conditional elasticities
that hold (discrete) store-category choices d and shopping choices c constant and only allow con-
tinuous quantity choices to change. The cross-elasticities conditional on store choices are positive
in sign. This shows that the cross-category complementarity derives from the consumer’s shopping
costs rather than from any intrinsic complementarity between the categories captured by Λkk′ .
Returning to Table 6 note that the principal diagonal in each of the within-firm elasticity
matrices gives own-price elasticities—i.e. same-firm same-category price elasticities. These are
generally larger in magnitude than the cross-category same-firm price elasticities (which are on
the off-diagonals). This difference is a consequence of two consumer responses that are allowed
in the consumer model (shown in equation (8)): (i) a reduction (at the intensive margin) in the
continuous demand for the category holding store choices fixed and (ii) a change of store for the
category but not for other categories, which is possible for two-stop shoppers (response class (2b)
in subsection 3.1).
Two further features of the own-price elasticities are noteworthy. First, they have less than
unit magnitude in some cases. Elasticities of less than unit magnitude are inconsistent with
positive marginal costs for a single-category seller (see (50) for the case of χf = 0). Elasticities of
this magnitude are, however, consistent with positive marginal costs when the firm internalizes a
positive externality on other categories (see (50) for χf = 1), which results in the firm setting prices
at a lower level than otherwise. Second, the own-price elasticities vary across firms in a plausible
way: they are higher for the discounter (Aldi) than for the Big Four firms, which may reflect
(i) the relatively high share of two-stop shoppers among the discounter’s customers (with their
greater ease of substituting a category between stores) and (ii) the relatively high price-sensitivity
of consumers attracted to discounter firms.
The off-diagonal 6 × 6 blocks give inter-firm elasticities. These are asymmetric in magnitude
because of the differences in firm market shares: the effect of prices at Aldi (which has small
market share) on demands at ASDA or Tesco (which have large market shares) is small (e.g.
see the top-right 6 × 6 block) compared to the opposite price elasticities. Note that the pattern
of elasticities within these off-diagonal blocks suggests there is a significant number of two-stop






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Within-Firm Cross-Category Elasticity Decomposition
ASDA: Conditional ASDA: Unconditional Tesco: Conditional Tesco: Unconditional
Bakery Fr,veg Meat Bakery Fr,veg Meat Bakery Fr,veg Meat Bakery Fr,veg Meat
Bk -0.373 0.005 0.020 -0.674 -0.282 -0.379 -0.367 0.006 0.019 -0.622 -0.268 -0.342
Fv 0.003 -0.232 0.002 -0.136 -0.646 -0.370 0.003 -0.274 0.002 -0.137 -0.700 -0.337
Mt 0.007 0.001 -0.261 -0.124 -0.173 -0.836 0.007 0.001 -0.271 -0.130 -0.250 -0.832
Notes: All elasticities are within-firm. Each cell is elasticity of row demand with respect to column price. Conditional
elasticities hold discrete choices (d, c) constant and allow only continuous choices to change. Unconditional elasticities
allow the consumer to change shopping choice c and the store j ∈ c used for each category.
response in the decomposition in equation (8))—e.g. in the top-middle block a change in the price
of Tesco Meat has a higher proportional effect on ASDA Meat (0.211) than ASDA Drink (0.147)
because of two-stop shoppers that switch stores for Meat only.
6.3 Predicted and Observed Profit Margins
In this section we compare the margins (i.e. the Lerner index) implied by the model with bounds
to profit margins calculated using external accounting data from competition inquiries CC (2000,
2008). This allows us to check whether the assumption of supermarket pricing is validated by
external data. We do this comparison at an overall level (across all categories) as well as for a
specific category (milk) for which there is relatively accurate margin data.
The margins reported by the CC are based on firms’ accounting data and cannot be unambigu-
ously mapped to our theoretical margin concept for two reasons. (The issues here are common
when dealing with accounting data on costs and revenues. For instance Nevo (2001) discusses
similar challenges when validating estimated margins with external data.) First, the CC only
reports total revenues and total wholesale costs at the retailer level. Hence we do not observe the
marginal wholesale price and need to make an assumption about the vertical contract that led to
the reported payments to manufacturers.41 Second, it is ambiguous what fraction of labor costs
should be considered marginal. We therefore provide bounds based on alternative assumptions
about vertical contracts and the fraction of labor costs that are marginal. Further details on how
we derive the bounds on margins are in Appendix I.
To obtain the profit margins implied by the model we solve the system of first-order conditions
(48) at estimated demand parameters under two alternative assumptions: supermarket pricing
(χf = 1 in (48)) and independent category pricing (χf = 0). This gives a marginal cost mcfk for
each of the combinations of f and k. Based on these marginal costs a simple preliminary check on
the two organizational assumptions is to ask whether either of them implies that marginal costs are
41We do not explicitly model the interaction between manufacturers and retailers (as for example in Sudhir (2001)
Besanko et al. (2003)). The external bounds that we calculate adopt an agnostic position as to whether there is
double marginalization or efficient pricing. There is relatively little direct evidence that discriminates between these
two alternative models of vertical contracting. Villas-Boas (2007) and Bonnet and Dubois (2010) use a structural
model of demand to compare the implications of the two modeling assumptions and reject double marginalization
in favor of efficient pricing (where the retailer optimizes against true vertical marginal costs).
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Table 8: Predicted Profit Margins and Observed Bounds to Margins
Milk All Categories
A: Bounds to margins from external data
A1 [Lower bound]: Retail margin; labor included in marginal cost 0.20 0.16
A2 [Upper bound]: Full vertical margin; labor excl. from marginal cost 0.34 0.52
B: Median predicted margins (95% confidence intervals)
B1: Supermarket Pricing, χf = 1 in equation (50) (0.22, 0.28) (0.28, 0.31)
B2: Independent Category Sellers, χf = 0 in equation (50) (0.65, 0.80) (0.71, 0.80)
C: Weighted Median predicted margins (95% confidence intervals)
C1: Supermarket Pricing, χf = 1 in equation (50) (0.22, 0.33) (0.37, 0.43)
C2: Independent Category Sellers, χf = 0 in equation (50) (0.68, 1.01) (0.91, 1.09)
Notes: Panel A gives bounds to profit margins using external data in CC inquiries. See Appendix I for details.
Panel B reports predicted median profit margins; medians are across categories and firms (All Categories)
across firms (Milk). Weighted medians are weighted by firm-category revenues from the estimation sample to
allow for heterogeneity in firm market shares.
negative. We find that all firm-category marginal costs are positive when we assume supermarket
organization but 14.8% of them are negative when we assume independent category sellers.
To assess the two organizational assumptions more formally, we present confidence intervals
for the profit margins implied when χf = 1 and χf = 0, respectively, and compare them with the
external bounds to profit margins from the CC report. Panels B and C report 95% confidence
intervals: the first column for the median margin in the milk category across firms, and the second
column for the median margin across all categories and firms. Since each external margin is an
industry-wide number, in Panel C we weight the medians by firm-category revenue to reflect vari-
ation in firm and category sizes. The weighted median is higher because firms with larger market
shares (such as the Big Four) tend to have greater market power. To calculate confidence intervals,
we take 2000 draws of the parameter vector from the (estimated asymptotic) distribution of our
estimator where for each draw we compute margins using equation (50). The confidence intervals
are then given by the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the resulting distribution of medians.42 If all
the margins permitted by the external bounds fall outside the 95% confidence interval for one of
the pricing assumptions, then this pricing assumption can be rejected at the 5% significance level
(for all margins permitted by the external bounds).
Consider first the milk category. Here external bounds to margins are 0.20 and 0.34. Under the
assumption of supermarket pricing the confidence intervals for margins—unweighted (0.22, 0.28),
weighted (0.23, 0.33)—fall within the external bounds. Thus we cannot reject (at the 5% level) the
null hypothesis of supermarket pricing (for all margins within the permitted bounds). Under the
assumption of independent category pricing, on the other hand, the confidence intervals—(0.65,
0.80) unweighted, (0.69, 1.01) weighted—fall outside the margins permitted by external bounds.
Thus we can reject (at the 5% level) the null hypothesis of independent category pricing.
42The same 2000 draws are used to generate the CIs in Tables 9 and 10. As a robustness check on the number
of draws we calculated the CIs in Table 8 using 5000 draws and found the CIs were almost unchanged: for example
the confidence intervals for weighted margins were (0.23, 0.33) for milk and (0.37, 0.43) for all categories under
supermarket pricing, and (0.71, 1.01) for milk and (0.92, 1.09) for all categories under independent category sellers.
35
Table 9: Profit Margins and Cross-Category Externalities
Median Mean (95% CI) Mean
All Categories Bakery Dairy Drink Dry Fr,Veg Hhold Meat Milk
A: Profit Margins
All Firms 0.30 0.31 (0.30, 0.33) 0.31 0.26 0.25 0.33 0.44 0.24 0.42 0.25
Big Four 0.37 0.38 (0.36, 0.41) 0.37 0.20 0.31 0.43 0.56 0.29 0.59 0.26
Discounter 0.28 0.29 (0.27, 0.31) 0.14 0.28 0.22 0.32 0.51 0.23 0.39 0.19
B: Inverse Own-Category Elasticity (Absolute Value)
All Firms 0.75 0.78 (0.73, 0.84) 1.02 0.75 0.57 0.81 0.93 0.67 0.79 0.75
Big Four 0.98 1.04 (0.97, 1.14) 1.46 0.75 0.72 1.15 1.34 0.86 1.11 0.89
Discounter 0.80 0.83 (0.76, 0.90) 1.10 1.00 0.61 0.78 0.97 0.72 0.84 0.58
C: Marginal Externality mefk/pfk
All Firms 0.42 0.47 (0.43, 0.52) 0.71 0.49 0.32 0.48 0.49 0.43 0.36 0.49
Big Four 0.61 0.66 (0.60, 0.74) 1.09 0.55 0.41 0.72 0.78 0.57 0.52 0.63
Discounter 0.46 0.54 (0.48, 0.60) 0.96 0.72 0.39 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.39
Notes: Profit margins and externalities implied by the model in Nash equilibrium (with supermarket pricing).
Figures in column All Categories average across categories and figures in rows All Firms, Big Four, and Dis-
counter average across firms of the stated type. By equation (50) figures in Panel A equal those in B minus those
in C. We focus on means (as opposed to medians) in this table in order to preserve this adding-up property.
Now consider all categories. Here the external bounds to margins are 0.16 and 0.52. Under the
assumption of supermarket pricing the confidence intervals—(0.28, 0.31) unweighted, (0.37, 0.43)
weighted—fall within the external bounds so we cannot reject the null hypothesis of supermarket
pricing. Under the assumption of independent category sellers the confidence intervals—(0.71,
0.80) unweighted, (0.91, 1.08) weighted—fall outside the margins permitted by the external data
and we can reject the hypothesis of independent category pricing (at the 5% level). Thus, even
though the external data have quite wide bounds, we can reject the null hypothesis of independent
category sellers. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of supermarket pricing.43 In the rest of this
section we use marginal costs under the assumption of supermarket pricing.
6.4 Market Power and Cross-Category Externalities
With elasticities and marginal costs in hand we now analyze the extent to which cross-category
externalities abate market power. Panel A of Table 9 reports profit margins for each category for
alternative firm types. Recall from equation (50) that the profit margin may be decomposed as the
category’s inverse elasticity minus its marginal externality on other categories (as a fraction of pfk).
We report these two components in Table 9: the inverse elasticity in Panel B and the marginal
cross-category externality in Panel C. To preserve the adding-up property of equation (50), we
report means rather than medians (medians are reported for All Categories for comparison). Panel
A is thus the corresponding figure in Panel B minus its counterpart in Panel C.
The overall mean (across all categories and firms) is 0.31 as reported in the top cell of the
43Alternatively, if supermarket pricing is taken as given, the confidence intervals for χf = 1 can be used to test
the null hypothesis that the model is correct, which, based on the same arguments as above, cannot be rejected.
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second column. Profit margins are highest for the Big Four firms, which is not surprising given
their large market shares. The inverse elasticities in Panel B are the profit margins that we would
have obtained if we had assumed that observed category prices are generated by independent
category sellers rather than supermarkets (i.e. if we had set χf = 0 in (50) to back out marginal
costs).44 For the mean across all categories, profit margins under independent category pricing
are more than double those with supermarket pricing (given in the first row of panel A). This
shows that cross-category effects play an important role in correctly assessing market power in the
supermarket industry.
The marginal externality reported in the table is a measure of the extent to which competition
is intensified by supermarket organization. It can be interpreted as the (Pigouvian) marginal
subsidy that must be offered to an independent seller to induce him to set prices that maximize
the profits of the supermarket as a whole. The marginal externality is analogous to the concept of
“upward pricing pressure” (see Farrell and Shapiro (2010)) used in antitrust policy to measure the
anti-competitive effects from a merger of two substitute products. Supermarket organization is
analogous to the merger of category sellers selling complementary goods; the marginal externality
measures the downward pricing pressure implied.
As Panel C reports, the marginal externality as a fraction of price, i.e. mefk/pfk, is 0.47 on av-
erage across firms and categories. The positive sign of the externality indicates that in supermarket
mode firms set prices closer to the competitive level than would be the case under independent cat-
egory sellers. Its magnitude indicates that this pro-competitive effect is economically significant.
As a benchmark we note that it is greater than the magnitudes conventionally used to identify
problematic merger cases (see CC (2011, Chapter 4) for a discussion).
The table shows the variation in externalities by category. The externality for category k on
any other category k′ is given by the product of (i) the profit margin of category k′ and (ii) the
“diversion ratio” between k and k′—i.e. the demand lost to the store on category k′ per unit of
demand lost on category k. A category has a large externality if these two factors are relatively
high. Note that marginal externalities can be high even for categories (such as Bakery) that are a
small share of consumer budgets (as shown in Table 2). This suggests that cross-category effects
can be important even when measuring market power for a category that is a small fraction of the
retailer’s sales.
Now compare externalities by firm. The Big Four firms have larger externalities than average.
This is in part a consequence of their higher profit margins (as reported in Panel A) and in part
a consequence of their shoppers having larger cross-category diversion ratios (as seen in the next
subsection).
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Table 10: Profit Effect of a Firm-Category Price Increase: Analysis by Shopper Types
Partition by: (µ, α,Γ) (Γ)
All Firms Big Four Discounters All
Median 95% CI Median 95% CI Median 95% CI Median





(i) All shoppers g = all 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 0.00
(ii) 1-stop types g = 1 -0.59 (-0.88, -0.47) -3.69 (-5.40, -2.41) -1.02 (-1.37, -0.71) -0.19
[proportion negative] [0.89] (0.82, 0.94) [0.84] (0.75, 1.00) [1.00] (0.92, 1.00) [0.67]
(iii) 2-stop types g = 2 0.59 (0.47, 0.88) 3.69 (2.41, 5.40) 1.02 (0.71, 1.37) 0.19
[proportion positive] [0.89] (0.82, 0.94) [0.84] (0.75, 1.00) [1.00] (0.92, 1.00) [0.67]









(i) All shoppers g = all -0.50 (-0.57, -0.45) -0.42 (-0.45, -0.35) -0.57 (-0.63, -0.51) -0.50
(ii) 1-stop types g = 1 -0.39 (-0.45, -0.37) -0.31 (-0.37, -0.29) -0.51 (-0.56, -0.43) -0.37
(iii) 2-stop types g = 2 -0.64 (-0.68, -0.56) -0.51 (-0.54, -0.44) -0.66 (-0.71, -0.59) -0.59











(i) All shoppers g = all 3.76 (3.51, 3.89) 4.55 (4.39, 4.67) 4.02 (3.78, 4.20) 3.76
(ii) 1-stop types g = 1 5.11 (4.79, 5.21) 5.64 (5.39, 5.74) 5.29 (4.99, 5.43) 5.43
(iii) 2-stop types g = 2 2.31 (2.23, 2.44) 3.06 (2.99, 3.17) 2.53 (2.39, 2.72) 2.79
Notes: All figures are medians across firm-category combinations for firms within stated type.
6.5 Competitive Implications of Alternative Shopper Taste Types
We now partition consumers into two groups based on their tendency to visit one or two stores and
compare their impact on market power. Each consumer in the model is characterized by a given
(µ, α,Γ)-type which fully describes his tastes for the shopping choices in his choice set, up to the
idiosyncratic term ε (which is iid across shopping choices). A consumer’s choice between one- and
two-stop shopping depends on his (µ, α,Γ)-type: for instance, high shopping costs (Γ) and/or a
high utility (µ−αp) at the same store for all categories are conducive to one-stop shopping. After
integrating out ε we calculate the probability, for each (µ, α,Γ)-type, that the consumer makes a
one-stop shopping choice.45 If this probability is greater than or equal to 0.5 at the observed prices
we place the (µ, α,Γ)-type in the one-stop group. Otherwise he is in the two-stop group. We refer
to these two groups as one-stop shopper types and two-stop shopper types respectively. Our goal
is to assess which group abates market power to the greater extent. At the end of this subsection
we consider an alternative partition based on Γ only.
44The 95% confidence intervals presented in this table differ from those in Table 8 because they are confidence
intervals of the means rather than medians. By comparing the confidence interval for “A: All Firms” with the
second column of Panel A of Table 8, we see that supermarket pricing is not rejected when using means, while the
interval for “B: All Firms” shows that category pricing is rejected for all external margins when using means. That
is, the conclusions in subsection 6.3 remain unchanged when using means instead of medians.
45The probability is
∑
c:n(c)=1 Pc(µ, α,Γ) where Pc(µ, α,Γ) is given by (18) and wit(c, pt) depends on (µ, α) as
discussed in subsection 3.2.
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To compare the impact of the two consumer groups on market power we consider how they
respond to a marginal price change for one firm-category combination at a time. These effects are
shown in Table 10. Note that the grouping into one-stop and two-stop shopper types is based on
consumers’ behavior at observed prices and is therefore exogenous to these price changes.
We first calculate profit effects. Let pif = Σkpifk denote firm f ’s profits (from all categories).
Row A(i) of Table 10 shows that the partial derivative of firm f ’s profit with respect to its price
for category k is zero for each (f, k)-combination. This is true by construction since marginal cost
has been calculated under the assumption that firms set each price to maximize profit. We now
decompose the profit effect by shopper group g. Let g = 1 for one-stop shopper types (defined
above), and g = 2 for two-stop shopper types. Let the profit derived from shopper group g be











so that the effects for the two groups must be equal in magnitude and (if non-zero) opposite in
sign. Rows A(ii) - A(iii) present the median group-specific profit effects along with 95% confidence
intervals for these effects. The median effect is negative for one-stop shopper types and positive for
two-stop shopper types. This pattern is seen for almost 90% of category store combinations. (The
effects are larger for the Big Four because of their larger market shares). The confidence intervals
imply that one-sided tests at the 2.5% significance level reject the null hypotheses that median
profit effects are positive for the one-stop types and that they are negative for the two-stop types,
respectively. The same is true if tests are performed separately for Big Four and Discounters.
Together the results indicate that one-stop shopper types constrain supermarket prices (and hence
abate market power) more than two-stop shopper types.
The next two panels in the table explore the factors underlying this finding. The first-order
condition (50) implies that the impact of a firm-category (f, k) price change on profit hinges on two
main factors: (i) the own-price elasticity of category k demand and (ii) the marginal cross-category
externality for firm f . Indicators for these two factors are presented for each consumer type in
Panels B and C of Table 10. We measure demand responses in these panels using the number
of shoppers Dfk for each category (defined analogously to (47) using (20)) which gives a simple
count measure of category demand that is easy to interpret and can be added across categories.
We decompose Dfk by consumer group as follows Dfk = D1fk+D2fk where D
g
fk denotes the number
of shoppers of group g.
Panel B of Table 10 considers own-price effects in terms of shoppers. Two-stop shopper types
have higher own-price demand elasticities. This is consistent with the intuition that shoppers that
tend to visit two stores can swap stores for a given category at relatively little cost.
Panel C turns to cross-category demand effects. To measure these we use the cross-category











(All Firms, All Categories) Baseline Ind pjk Alt distij Alt Λkk′ Ind Λkk′
A: Margins and Externalities
Margin (pfk −mcfk)/pfk 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.29
Externality mefk/pfk 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.42
B: Effect of Firm-Category Increase
1-stop shopper types -0.59 -0.51 -0.66 -0.62 -0.58
[proportion negative] [0.89] [0.89] [0.89] [0.88] [0.83]
2-stop shopper types 0.59 0.51 0.66 0.62 0.58
[proportion positive] [0.89] [0.89] [0.89] [0.88] [0.83]
Notes: Entries are medians for All Firms and All Categories and therefore can be
compared to the corresponding medians in Table 9 for Panel A and Table 10 for Panel
B. The Baseline model is the model used elsewhere in Section 6 (Model 2 in Section
5). Parameters for the other models are in Appendix J.
where the numerator and denominator of this ratio are both negative. In the case of the numerator
this is because the categories for a given firm f are complements. The ratio (51) is the total number
of shoppers lost by firm f for categories other than k for every shopper (in group g) that stops
buying category k. We find a strong difference between shopper types: the median diversion ratio
for one-stop shopper types (5.11) is more than double that of two-stop shopper types (2.31).
Taken together the own- and cross-category effects of a price change, shown in Panels B and C,
explain why one-stop shopper types constrain the market power of the firms more than the average
shopper: such shoppers (i) generate much larger than average cross-category demand effects per
marginal consumer (Panel C), and (ii) this effect is strong enough to outweigh the differences
between one- and two-stop shopper types in terms of own-category demand elasticity (Panel B).
In the last column we consider an alternative partition of consumer types by shopping costs (Γ)
only. Types with above-median shopping costs (for this classification defined as the cost of visiting
a second store and traveling 10km) are now classified in group g = 1 and the remaining consumers
in group g = 2. The results are similar despite this partition being less strongly associated with
one-stop / two-stop shopping behavior than that based on the full set of tastes (µ, α,Γ).
6.6 Robustness
The results in Section 6 used Model 2 from Section 5. In this section we refer to this as the
baseline model. We now consider four alternative specifications of the model. We discuss these
specifications before showing that the main findings of the paper are robust.
The model labeled Ind pjk changes the variable used for prices. It has price indices using
weights that are computed using individual budget shares rather than budget shares for specific
demographic groups (as done in the baseline model). The construction of these individual-specific
price indices is described in Appendix C.2.
The model labeled Alt distij uses an alternative variable for distance. Instead of the sum of the
distances from the consumer to each store and back we use the minimum distance the consumer
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would travel if he went in a triangle between home, store j, and store j′. This only makes a
difference to the distance variable when the consumer is a two-stop shopper. Thus distance when
n(c) = 2 is now given by distic = (distij +distjj′ +distij′) instead of 2(distij +distij′). This allows
for the possibility that the consumer takes advantage of geographic synergies when visiting the
two stores.
The model labeled Alt Λkk′ estimates a different set of variable utility interaction parameters
than in the baseline model. (These are bakery and dry, dairy and meat, and drink and milk).
Cross-price variables in the Z vectors, discussed in 4.1, are modified to reflect the changes in
interactions.
Finally the model labeled Ind Λkk′ allows for individual (observed and unobserved) consumer
heterogeneity in the quadratic second-order terms (for k′ 6= k). As household size is one of the
most important forms of heterogeneity we use the specification
Λikk′ = Λkk′(1 + λ11[hzi = 2] + λ21[hzi > 2] + σ5νΛikk′)
where (λ1, λ2, σ5) are additional parameters and the terms 1[hzi = 2] and 1[hzi > 2] are indicator
variables for household size. νΛikk′ is an iid random draw from a standard normal distribution.
In addition to the variables in ZQitcjk and ZDitcjk in the baseline specification we include, for each
category, the following two variables: indicators for whether household size is 2, and for whether
it is greater than 2, each interacted with the mean price of all categories other than k in the stores
in the relevant shopping choice.
We check for robustness to these alternatives by comparing their implications for the main
results discussed in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 of the paper. This is done in Table 11. Panel A of the
table presents the median profit margins and externalities, across all firms and categories, which we
use in Table 9 to assess the pro-competitive effects of supermarket organization. Panel B compares
the marginal profit effects of one-stop and two-stop shopper types as we did in Table 10. The table
shows these alternative specifications give results that are very similar to those we found for our
baseline model. The parameters for the alternative specifications are given in Appendix J.
7 Conclusions
In many important competitive settings, such as retailing, customers buy multiple categories and
many prefer to do so from the same location or firm. We develop a multi-store multi-category
model for estimation of consumer demand, relevant for the analysis of pricing in such settings. We
estimate the model using data from the supermarket industry in the UK. We use the estimated
model to analyze two policy-relevant questions: (i) the implications of the internalization of cross-
category externalities for the market power of supermarkets and (ii) the relative impact on market
power of shopper types inclined to one-stop and two-stop shopping.
The cross-category elasticities we estimate imply that supermarket organization substantially
mitigates market power. This has implications for the analysis of retail pricing at two levels. First,
at a single-category level of analysis, it indicates a role for considering cross-category effects when
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using demand elasticities to analyze prices for a given category of interest. In our application we
found that accounting for cross-category effects implies a Lerner index typically less than half as
large as the Lerner index that would be implied with independent category sellers, so that ignoring
cross-category effects can result in market power being overestimated significantly.
Second, at a broader level, the results are relevant for analysis of the organization of the retail
industry. Supermarket competition has received much attention—in part because of the large size
of firms such as Walmart, Carrefour and Tesco—and policies are sometimes introduced with the
aim of protecting or promoting alternative ways of organizing the industry: e.g. planning laws in
the UK were tightened in the 1990s to protect town centre retailing, while in France a law (Loi
Raffarin, 1996) imposed floor space limits on supermarkets with the objective of protecting small
traditional retailers. Our empirical results highlight the pro-competitive nature of supermarket
pricing relative to alternative ways of organizing retail supply in which pricing is decentralized to
independent category sellers.
Comparing one-stop and two-stop shopping types we find that when supermarkets increase
the price of a category marginally they lose profits earned on one-stop shopper types and gain
profits from two-stop shopper types, which implies that the former constrain supermarket prices
more than the latter. This finding suggests it can be appropriate for antitrust authorities to focus
on competition for a firm’s one-stop (or core) shoppers even where there are many multi-stop
shoppers in the firm’s customer mix. This is consistent with the position adopted by the FTC in
the recent Whole Foods/Wild Oats antitrust case where the question was whether to allow the
merger of firms that compete for the same group of one-stop (or core) shoppers, when the firms
also sell to two-stop (or cross) shoppers. More generally the finding indicates that the presence
of consumers inclined toward two-stop shopping (e.g. those with low shopping costs) does not
necessarily enhance competitive pricing incentives.
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A Online Appendix: Category Definitions
TNS assigns to each transaction the variable “Retailer Share Track (RST) Market Code” that
correspond to 269 narrowly defined product groups. We define our eight categories as follows
where the names of product groups (including abbreviations) are those of TNS.
1. Bakery: Ambient Pizza Bases, Ambient Cakes and Pastries, Ambient Christmas Pudding,
Ambient Sponge Puddings, Canned Rice Puddings, Childrens Biscuits, Chilled Breads,
Chilled Cakes, Chilled Desserts, Chilled Pizza and Bases, Crackers & Crispbreads, Every-
day Biscuits, Fresh/Chilled Pastry, Frozen Bread, Frozen Savoury Bakery, Healthier Biscuits,
Morning Goods, Savoury Biscuits, Seasonal Biscuits, Tinned Sponge Puddings, Toaster Pas-
tries, Total Bread.
2. Dairy: Butter, Defined Milk and Cream Products, Fresh Cream, Fromage Frais, Instant
Milk, Margarine, Total Cheese, Total Ice Cream, Yoghurt, Yoghurt Drinks And Juices.
3. Drink: Ambient One Shot Drinks, Ambient Fruit or Yoghurt Juice and Drnk, Beer and
Lager, Bottled Colas, Bottled Lemonade, Bottled Other Flavours, Bottled Shandies, Canned
Colas, Canned Lemonade, Canned Other Flavours, Canned Shandies, Chilled One Shot
Drinks, Cider, Fabs, Food Drinks, Fortified Wines, Ginger Ale, Lemon and Lime Juices,
Mineral Water, Soda Water, Sparkling Wine, Spirits, Tonic Water, Wine.
4. Dry: Ambient Condiments, Ambient Slimming Products, Ambient Vegetarian Products,
Artificial Sweetners, Breakfast Cereals, Chocolate Biscuit Bars, Chocolate Confectionery,
Chocolate Spread, Confectionary. & Other Exclusions, Cooking Oils, Crisps, Dry Meat
Substitutes, Dry Pasta, Dry Pulses and Cereal, Ethnic Ingredients, Everyday Treats, Flour,
Frozen Confectionery, Gum Confectionery, Herbal Tea, Herbs and Spices, Home Baking,
Honey, Instant Coffee, Lards and Compounds, Liquid and Ground Coffee and Beans,
Mincemeat (Sweet), Mustard, Packet Stuffing, Peanut Butter, Pickles Chutneys & Relish,
Powder Desserts & Custard, Preserves, RTS. Custard, Ready To Use Icing, RTS Desserts
Long Life, Salt, Savoury Snacks, Sour and Speciality Pickles, Special Treats, Suet, Sugar,
Sugar Confectionery, Sweet and Savoury Mixes, Syrup & Treacle, Table Sauces, Table and
Quick Set Jellies, Tea, Vinegar.
5. Fruit and Vegetables: Ambient Olives, Ambient Rice and Savoury Noodles, Ambient Salad
Accompaniment, Baked Bean, Bitter Lemon, Canned Fish, Canned Hot Meats, Canned
Salads, Canned Vegetables, Chilled Fruit Juice and Drink, Chilled Olives, Chilled Prepared
Fruit and Veg, Chilled Prepared Salad, Chilled Rice, Chilled Salad Accompaniment, Chilled
Vegetarian, Cous Cous, Frozen Potato Products, Frozen Vegetables, Frozen Vegetarian Prods,
Fruit, Instant Mashed Potato, Nuts, Prepared Peas & Beans, Tinned Fruit, Tomato Products,
Total Fruit Squash, Vegetable.
6. Household: Air Fresheners, Anti-Diarrhoeals, Antiseptics & Liq. Disinfectant, Bath Ad-
ditives, Batteries, Bin Liners, Bleaches & Lavatory Cleaners, Body Sprays, Carpet Clean-
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ers/Stain Removers, Cat Litter, Cat and Dog Treats, Cleaning Accessories, Cold Sore Treat-
ment, Cold Treatments, Conditioners and Creme Rinses, Contact Lens Cleaners, Cotton
Wool, Cough Liquids, Cough Lozenges, Decongestants, Dental Floss or Sticks, Dentifrice,
Denture Cleaners/Fixature, Deodorants, Depilatories, Dog Food, Electric Light Bulbs, Eye
Care, Fabric Conditioners, Facial Tissues, First Aid Dressings, Foot Preparations, Furniture
Polish, Hair Colourants, Hairsprays, Hand Wash Products, Hayfever Remedies, Home Perms,
Household Cleaners, Household Food Wraps, Household Insecticides, Incontinence Products,
Indigestion Remedies, Kitchen Towels, Laxatives, Liquid Soap, Machine Wash Products,
Mens Hairsprays, Mens Mass Fragrances, Mens Skincare, Moist Wipes, Mouthwashes, Oral
Analgesics, Oral Lesion/teething, Pot Pourri and Scented Candles and Oils, Razor Blades,
Sanpro, Shampoo, Shaving Soaps, Shoe Care Products, Skincare, Sleeping Aids, Sun Prepa-
rations, Talcum Powder, Toilet Soap inc. Mens, Toilet Tissues, Topical Analgesics, Topical
Antiseptics, Total Cat Food inc. Bulk, Total Dry Dog Food, Total Male and Female Styling,
Total Toothbrushes, Upset Stomach Remedies, Vitamin and Mineral supplements, Wash
Additives, Washing Up Products.
7. Meat: Ambient Cooking Sauces, Ambient Dips, Ambient Pastes and Spreads, Ambient
Sandwich Fillers, Ambient Soup, Canned Pasta Products, Chilled Black and White Pud-
ding, Chilled Burgers and Grills, Chilled Cooking Sauces, Chilled Dips, Chilled Gravy and
Stock, Chilled Pate and Paste and Spread, Chilled Prepared Fish, Chilled Processed Poul-
try, Chilled Ready Meals, Chilled Sausage Meat, Chilled Frankfurter/Continental Sausages,
Chilled Sandwich Fillers, Cold Canned Meats, Complete Dry/Ambient Meals, Cooked Meats,
Cooked Poultry, Fresh Bacon Joint, Fresh Bacon Rashers, Fresh Bacon Steaks, Fresh Beef,
Fresh Flavoured Meats, Fresh Lamb, Fresh Other Meat & Offal, Fresh Pasta, Fresh Pork,
Fresh Poultry, Fresh Sausages, Fresh Soup, Frozen Bacon, Frozen Beef, Frozen Cooked Poul-
try, Frozen Fish, Frozen Flavoured Meats, Frozen Lamb, Frozen Meat Products, Frozen
Other Meat & Offal, Frozen Pizzas, Frozen Pork, Frozen Poultry, Frozen Processed Poultry,
Frozen Ready Meals, Frozen Sausage Meat, Frozen Sausages, Hens Eggs, Instant Hot Snacks,
Loose Fresh Meat & Pastry, Meat Extract, Other Chilled Convenience, Other Frozen Foods,
P/P Fresh Meat and Veg and Pastry, Packet Soup, Shellfish, Wet or Smoked Fish.
8. Milk: Total Milk.
B Estimation Sample: Construction & Representativeness
We implement the sample selection by drawing a week at random for each consumer to represent
his third (and final) week in the estimation sample (this must be drawn from outside his first two
quarters in the sample). To obtain the second and first weeks in the estimation sample we use the
weeks that are one quarter-year and two quarter-years before the third week. When these exact
weeks are not available we substitute the most recent available week (that is at least one quarter or
two quarters before the final week). We drop consumers for whom three weeks cannot be obtained
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using this method because they do not participate long enough to be in the data for three successive
quarters, which results in a loss of 23% of the initial sample of 26,191. We then draw 2000 of the
remaining consumers at random to form an estimation sample of 6000 consumer-weeks.
Sample selection problems could arise either because the TNS sample is not representative
for the UK population or because the subsample we select is not representative for the full TNS
sample. Regarding the latter issue, note that we select consumers almost randomly subject to the
constraint that they are in the sample long enough so that we observe each consumer in 3 different
quarters. Regarding the former issue, TNS claims to survey a representative sample of consumers
and has a commercial interest in making the sample representative.46 Nevertheless, we analyze
explicitly whether the sample is representative by comparing demographics across our sample, the
full TNS sample and census data. In Table 12 Full Sample refers to the consumers in the raw
sample, Estimation Sample refers to the 2000 consumers selected for estimation, and Validation
Sample refers to the 2000 consumers used in the out-of-sample analysis in Section 5. A comparison
of sample moments shows that they are similar. The column Great Britain refers to data from
2001 census and allows comparison between the TNS sample means and those of the population.
Table 12: Comparison of Sample Moments
Full Sample Estimation Sample Validation Sample Great Britain
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean
Household-level statistics:
Number of Adults 2.0 0.8 2.0 0.8 2.0 0.8 NA
Number of Children 0.8 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.7 1.0 NA
Household size 2.8 1.4 2.8 1.3 2.7 1.3 2.4
Characteristics of Household Reference Person:
Home owner (0/1) 0.74 0.41 0.78 0.41 0.76 0.43 0.69
Age 45.5 16.0 46.9 15.8 47.0 16.0 49.2
Retired (0/1) 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.17
Employed (0/1) 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.67 0.47 0.68
Unemployed (0/1) 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.03
Observations: 26,191×67.6 2000×3 2000×3 —
Notes: The Household Reference Person is a senior member of the household identified using criteria
used for the 2001 census in Great Britain. All figures in the column marked Great Britain are for Great
Britain from the 2001 Census with the following exceptions: (i) the figure for home ownership is from GB
Housing Statistics, rather than the Census, and (ii) the figures for Retired, Employed, and Unemployed
status in the last column are for England & Wales only as Scotland does not report this breakdown for the
Household Reference Person (when Scotland is eliminated from the Full Sample, the Estimation Sample and
the Validation Sample, it does not change the moments reported in the table for these variables).
46The commercial value of the data in the form of market analysis for firms requires a representative sample.
Kantar describes the panel as a “purchase panel consisting of 30,000 demographically representative households in
GB” (http://www.kantarworldpanel.com/en/Consumer-Panels-/alcohol”, retrieved 10/7/2016).
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C Online Appendix: Price Index Construction
C.1 Baseline Price Indices
The prices used in the model are computed at category-week-store-demographic group level for
categories k = 1, .., 8 using the full sample of transactions in the TNS data. (See below for a
description of the demographic groups).
In data there are two levels of aggregation below category k. First, in each category k (e.g.
“Household Goods”), there is a set of narrowly-defined product groups g (e.g. “Shampoo”) listed
in Appendix A. We drop some minor product groups that are not sold by all firms, which leaves
183 (out of 268) product groups that account for 96% of consumer expenditure. We define this set
of product groups Gk for each k.
Second, within each product group g ∈ Gk there is a set of products h, each of which is a unique
product and pack size (e.g. “Herbal Essences Fresh Balance Shampoo 200ml” is a product in the
“Shampoo” group). Products h are numerous and there is a tail of products with low volume.
For each firm f we select products h that appear in the data at least once in each year (2002 -
2005) and in more than six quarterly periods. This yields a set of products, Hfg, for each firm f
and product group g. For each store j product h and week t we compute price pjht as the median
price of product h for week t for stores operated by store j’s firm f(j). As noted in Section 2
the predominant pricing practice is national pricing, in which firms do not vary prices depending
on the location of their stores. In cases where there are no observed prices for a particular week
we impute the price using the median price for the quarter-year in which week t falls. We obtain
13 firm-level prices for each t and h: one for each of the following: ASDA, Morrison, Sainsbury,
Tesco, M&S, Waitrose, Aldi, Lidl, Netto, Iceland, Co-op, and Somerfield, and smaller chains.
The aggregation to category k level thus proceeds in two stages: (i) from product h to product
group g and (ii) from product group g to category k. In each of these stages we weight the prices
to reflect their importance using information from the transactions data.
To allow for taste variation at an intra-category level we compute weights separately for the
eight demographic types m = 1, .., 8 which are combinations of social class and household size
categories. The TNS household characteristics data has six social class levels (1, ..., 6) based on
occupational group. These social class indicators are used widely in United Kingdom as a measure
of socioeconomic status. A lower number on this scale has a higher average household income. We
combine social class level 1 and 2, and likewise 5 and 6, as there are relatively few households in
these groups, which yields four social class categories. For each of these we divide households into
two size groups—small (one or two people) and large (more than two people)—which yields the
eight demographic types.
In the first stage of aggregation the product group g price in store j for week t and demographic




hf(j)pjht where wmhf(j) are volume weights. We use volume
weights at this stage since there is a common volume unit for products within each g (e.g. volumes
in “Shampoo” are in ml). If each product were sold in each firm then we could proceed using volume
weights wmhf = Qmh /Qmg where Qmh is the total volume of product h sold to demographic group m
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over the three year period and Qmg is the total volume sold in product group g to demographic
group m over the three year period. However, each product h is not sold by all firms so we instead
compute w˜mhf = Qmh /Qmg|h where Qmg|h is the volume sold in product group g to demographic groupm




hf in order to ensure that the weights add
up to one for any firm (i.e. ∑h∈Hgf wmhf = 1 for any f) . This weights products using information
that is not specific to firm f for products that are sold by more than one firm and uses firm f
specific information otherwise.
In the second stage of aggregation we obtain the category price pmjkt using is a revenue-weighted










The weights ωmg are the total expenditure share (over the three year period) of each product group
g for demographic typem (where∑g∈Gk ωmg = 1 for eachm). The weights are constant across stores
and over time. Following common practice in price index construction (see for example Chapter
2 in ONS(2014)47) we (i) use sales rather than volume weights at this upper level of aggregation
because the different product groups are often in different units, and (ii) use price ratios in (52) to
ensure that pmjkt is independent of the units chosen within any product group. We set the arbitrary
base price pmbg in the price ratio to be the price in the first week (t = 1) in ASDA stores.
C.2 Individual Price Indices
The individual price indices used in subsection 6.6 differ in the second stage of aggregation by
using an individual-specific weighting term—instead of a demographic group weighting term—to
aggregate from product group (g) to category (k) level. (We do the individual weighting at the
product group g level but not the individual product h level because many individual products such
as “private labels” are firm-specific and an individual consumer typically only visits a subset of the
firms in the data). The category price pijkt for individual consumer i is a budget share-weighted
average of price ratios pmjgt/pmbg at product group level (where pmjgt and pmbg are as defined above for










where weights ωig are now the total expenditure share (over the three year period) of each product
group g by consumer i and satisfy ∑g∈Gk ωig = 1 for each i. The weights are constant across stores
and over time.
47Office for National Statistics (2014) “Consumer Price Indices Technical Manual”, available at
http://www.ons.gov.uk
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D Online Appendix: A General Multi-Store-Category Model
In this Appendix we show how the model we estimate can be derived from a more general framework
of multi-store and multi-category demand. At the most general level, the consumer chooses for
each category k ∈ {1, ..., K} in every store j ∈ {1, ..., J}, how much quantity qjk to purchase,




s.t. p′q ≤ y,
where q = (q11, ..., qJK , q0) denotes the quantity vector for all store/category combinations, and
the outside option is q0. The price vector p = (p11, ..., pJK , 1) is defined analogously (the price of
the outside good is normalized to one). θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated and X a vector
of observable store, category and consumer characteristics. y denotes the consumer’s income.
In this setting corner solutions in quantity are likely to arise and they can originate from two
sources. Either the consumer does not visit a particular store and hence cannot purchase any
positive quantity there. Or the consumer might visit the store, but decides not purchase any
quantity in a specific category. Dealing with the choice over J ×K quantities with possible corner
solutions for many of the quantities makes this a difficult demand system to estimate and we
hence impose a set of restrictions based on the data patterns described in Section 2 of the paper.
Specifically, we assume that the cost of visiting more than two stores is prohibitively high, so that
no consumer wishes to visit a third store in a given week and that consumers only purchase at one
store within a given category.








V (c, d, q, θ,X)
s.t. p′dq + q0 ≤ y
This formulation allows us to break up the problem into a discrete choice between (pairs of, or
single) stores c, a discrete choice of store for each category d and a continuous quantity choice in
each category q. To derive equation (1) in Section 3 of the paper this formulation also assumes
utility is additively separable in the variable utility derived from purchasing a specific basket of
goods and shopping costs and that variable utility is linear in the outside good. Substituting the




In this Appendix we discuss the assumptions under which we can aggregate demand from product
to category level, and show how this can underpin the utility function we use in the paper. Our
derivation follows closely the established literature on aggregation (see Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980)). We adopt the approach of using separability restrictions on preferences (see Gorman
(1953) as opposed to that of assuming colinear prices (Hicks (1946)). This approach is commonly
used in papers that require aggregation to estimate models in an AIDS framework (see for example
Hausman and Zona (1994)).
Let us first define some notation. Let there be H products and let the quantities bought by a
consumer be x = (x1, x2, x3, ..., xH). These can be grouped by category using xk so that we may
write x = (x1, ...,xk, ...,xK). In a similar way let product level prices be p = (p1, p2, p3, ..., pH) =
(p1, ...,pk, ...,pK). To distinguish category level from product level prices we use ρk to denote the
category level price index (note this deviates from the notation in the main text). We denote
category aggregate quantities (q1, ..., qK). Let x−k denote a consumption vector for products not
in category k. Weak separability for category k requires (x1k,x−k)  (x0k,x−k) ⇒ (x1k,x∗−k) 
(x0k,x∗−k) ∀x∗−k i.e. the quantities an agent consumes of products in other categories (x∗−k) does
not change the preferences a consumer has between any two bundles in category k (here, x1k and
x0k). This in turn implies that the consumer’s problem may be written:
max
x
u = U [vk(xk),x−k] subject to y = px (54)
where vk(xk) is a category-specific utility function for category k and y is the consumer’s overall
budget.
We can now divide the consumer’s problem into two stages: a “first stage” inter-category budget
allocation decision in which budget yk is allocated to category k and a number of independent
“second stage” problems in which the utility uk = vk(xk) from category k is maximized given the
budget yk. The indirect utility for the second stage problem is
ψk(yk,pk) = maxxk vk(xk) subject to pkxk = yk.
The first stage decision of how much budget to allocate to category k can be characterized as a
decision of how much category-specific utility uk to enjoy, i.e. if category k is weakly separable
(without saying anything about the other categories) we can rewrite (54) as
max
uk,x−k
U [uk,x−k] subject to y = ek(uk,pk) + p−kx−k (55)
where the category level expenditure function (dual to the indirect utility function ) is substituted
in place of the category k budget.
If the agent’s preferences over products in category k are homothetic then we can write the
category specific indirect utility
ψk(yk,pk) = yk/ρk(pk) (56)
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where ρk(pk) is the lower-stage price index which must be homogeneous of degree one. From this
expression it follows that uk = ek(uk,pk)/ρk(pk) and hence (by rearranging) the amount budgeted
is ek = ukρk(pk) which allows us to replace the expenditure function inside the budget constraint
expression in (55) above so that the “first stage” decision can be rewritten
max
uk,x−k
U [uk,x−k] subject to y=ukρk(pk) + p−kx−k.
From this it follows that uk plays the role of a category-level quantity aggregate and ρk(pk) as a
category level price index. Using (56), the category quantity qk is obtained by dividing category
expenditure yk by the price index ρk(pk).
We can now derive the utility function we use in the paper. The derivation above extends
easily to the case of weak separability between all categories. Under this assumption, we can write
overall utility as being composed of category-level sub-utilities.
u = U [v1(x1), ..., vk(xk), ...]
where xk denotes the vector of quantities of goods within category k and vk() denotes the sub-
utility function for category k. Under the additional assumption of homotheticity (within each
category), the indirect utility in each category is given by yk/ρk(pk), where yk is category-level
expenditure and ρk(pk) is a price index. yk/ρk(pk) can be interpreted as a category-level quantity
index.48 We can now think of the utility-function across categories as
u = U [v1(x1), ..., vk(xk), ...] = U [q1, ..., qk, ...] = µ′dq − 0.5q′Λq + αq0 (57)
This function defines variable utility across all categories (and the outside option). Substituting
the budget constraint for q0 and adding the shopping cost term, we obtain equation (2) in the
main text.
References
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48Under the assumption of additive (strong) separability between categories, we can replace the assumption
that product-level utility is homothetic, with the weaker assumption that product-level utilities have a Generalized
Gorman Polar Form.
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F Online Appendix: Variables used in Moments
• [ZQitcjk]: household i size hzi, time dummies Tt (2 years, 3 quarters), price ptjk, price for
categories k′ 6= k (for which we estimate cross effects), log store j size (szj), indicator that
there are two stores in shopping choice c, 1[n(c)=2], firm dummies (eight of the nine firms in
footnote (21)) and a constant.
• [ZDitcjk]: as ZQitcjk but without time dummies Tt.
• [ZIitc]: distance distitc, two-stop shopping indicator 1[n(c)=2], distance squared (distitc)2, inter-
action of distance and the two-stop shopping indicator 1[n(c)=2], mean price across categories
and stores for shopping choice c at time t, and mean price across categories and stores for
shopping choice c at time t divided by per capita income.
G Likelihood Function
In this Appendix we derive the likelihood function for the model. The observed choice outcome is
the triple (c, d, q): a discrete shopping choice c (up to two stores), a vector d = (d1, .., dK) which
indicates the store j ∈ c chosen for each category k = 1, .., K, and a K-vector of continuous choices
q = (q1, . . . , qK) for each category. The likelihood of this choice outcome at parameters θ for an
individual consumer, written L(c, q, d|θ), is given by the probability that his unobserved tastes
(ν, ) are in the region that rationalize the choice (c, d, q) given the taste density f(ν|θ) and the
type-1 extreme value distribution for .
We proceed in four steps. First, in section G.1 we express the variable utility specification in an
alternative but equivalent way that facilitates the derivation of the likelihood. Second, in section
G.2, we derive the set of unobserved tastes ν that are consistent with utility maximization given
the category choices (d, q) at shopping choice c. Third, in section G.3, we derive the likelihood of
the observed category decisions (d, q) treating the shopping choice (c) as exogenous. Finally, in
section G.4, we derive the joint likelihood of the triple (c, d, q) allowing the shopping choice (c)
to be endogenous. Throughout we consider a single consumer-week observation and so to avoid
clutter we can suppress (i, t) subscripts from the notation.
The likelihood is a generalization of likelihoods derived previously for two separate groups of
models: (i) those that consider corner solutions for products (or product categories) but do not
allow for store choices (Kim et al (2002) and Wales and Woodland (1982)), and (ii) discrete-
continuous models that consider only a single continuous choice but do not allow for zero expen-
ditures (Dubin McFadden (1984), Smith (2004)).
G.1 Variable Utility and Category-Store Choices
In this section we present the variable utility specification in our paper (i.e. the first two terms in
(1)) in an alternative but equivalent form that facilitates derivation of the likelihood. Given the
specification assumptions of our model, outlined in subsection 3.2, we can write the consumer’s
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variable utility from the choice (q, d, c) as












where 1(dk = j) is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the consumer chooses store j for category
k and 0 otherwise.












Recall that α is a random term. It is convenient to write the random effects in (58) terms of a
single unobserved taste term for each (j, k) so we define νwjk = ν
µ
jk − αpjk which implies variable






















Maximization of (60) with respect to qjk for all k and all j ∈ c yields the same outcome as
maximization of (59) with respect to q = (q1, . . . , qK) and d = (d1, .., dK). Thus when the shopping
choice has two stores (n(c) = 2) the utility function implies that consumers use one store per
category as an outcome of utility maximization (with respect to quantity qjk in each store j ∈ c)
not an outcome of a constraint on the maximization of utility. This in turn implies that the chosen
quantities qjk satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximization of (60) with respect to qjk,
subject to qjk ≥ 0, for all k and all j ∈ c. We use these conditions in the next section.
G.2 Unobserved variable utility tastes implied by choice (c, d, q)
We now derive the implications of observed choice (c, d, q) and utility maximization for unobserved
tastes νwjk for j ∈ c.
When demand at store j for category k is positive (qjk > 0) the first order condition for
maximization of equation (60) with respect to qjk is satisfied. This implies that the taste shock
νwjk has a unique value ν¯wjk given by




If alternatively the consumer’s observed quantity choice for category k at store j ∈ c is zero
(qjk = 0) the first order condition is not satisfied but the Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply the
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derivative of utility (60) with respect to quantity qjk is not positive which gives the following
upper limit for the category-store taste shock




The conditions (61) and (62) together give the following restrictions on unobserved tastes νwjk
for j ∈ c that are consistent with the observed choices (c, q, d) and utility maximization:
ν¯wjk = −µ¯jk + Λkk(Σj∈cqjk) + 0.5
∑
k′ 6=k Λkk′(Σj∈cqjk′) if qjk > 0
and
νwjk∈ Ajk if qjk = 0
where Ajk is the set of values for νwjk that are consistent with zero demand for (j, k), i.e.




Thus we have a unique point value for (j, k) with positive demand and a set Ajk of values for (j, k)
with zero demand.
G.3 Likelihood when shopping choice c is exogenous
We now use the restrictions on tastes derived in the last section to derive a likelihood L(q, d|θ) for
the observed choice (q, d) assuming that the consumer’s shopping choice c is exogenous. Let
νwc = (νwj1, ..., νwjK)j∈c. (64)
Suppose the consumer is observed to have positive demands for a number l of store-category (j, k)
combinations and let ν(1)c denote the l-vector of unobserved tastes ν¯wjk for these. Let ν(2)c be taste
shocks for remaining (j, k) combinations, i.e. those with zero demand. The vector of category-store
taste shocks νwc in (64) can be written
νwc = (ν(1)c , ν(2)c ).
Let the joint density be f(ν(1)c , ν(2)c |θ). The likelihood that a consumer selects (q, d) combines a
probability density component for the unobserved taste elements in ν(1)c (which each have a unique
value ν¯wjk given utility maximization at parameters θ) and a probability mass component for the
unobserved taste elements in ν(2)c (which each have a range of possible values Ajk given utility
maximization at parameters θ). The likelihood is given by integrating the probability density f




f(ν¯(1)c , ν(2)c |θ)abs[J ] dν(2)c (65)
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where ν¯(1)c is the vector of unobserved store-category taste shocks that satisfy the first order con-
dition in (61) for all (j, k) with positive demand. Note that abs[J ] is the absolute value of the
Jacobian for the transformation from ν¯wjk to qjk for all the errors in the vector ν¯(1)c . (From (61)
the elements in matrix J are given by the second order utility terms in the quadratic utility, i.e.:
∂ν¯wjk/∂qjk′ = Λkk′ , etc.). Finally A(c, q, d) is the set of values for unobserved tastes ν(2)c that are
consistent with utility maximization given choice (c, q, d) and is defined using (63) as follows
A(c, q, d) = ×(jk)∈{ (jk)| qjk = 0,j ∈ c}Ajk
where × denotes the Cartesian product of the sets. The likelihood (65) is identical in form to
equation (7) on page 234 in Kim et al. (2002) and equation (9) on page 266 in Wales and Woodland
(1982).
G.4 Likelihood when shopping choice c is endogenous
We now derive the likelihood L(c, q, d|θ) for the observed shopping triple (c, d, q) allowing shopping
choice c to be endogenous. Unlike the treatment in subsection G.3 we must now consider shopping
costs Γc and the variable utility from stores j /∈ c. The observed shopping choice c depends on the
full set of consumer tastes ν defined as follows
ν = {(νwj1, ..., νwjK)j∈J , νΓ}. (66)
Let the joint density of these be f(ν). The probability of observing shopping choice c given
unobserved tastes ν is given by equation 18. Rewriting this in terms of ν we have
Pc(ν|θ) = exp(w(c, pc, ν
w
c ) + Γc(νΓ))∑
c′∈C exp(w(c′, pc′ , νwc′ ) + Γc′(νΓ))
(67)
where νwc′ are as defined in (64) for any c′ ∈ C.
We use the restrictions derived in section G.2 to determine the set of values of νwc (for the chosen
c) that are consistent with the observed choice (q, d) and the taste parameters. As in section G.3 we
write νwc = (ν(1)c , ν(2)c ) where ν(1)c denotes the vector of unobserved tastes νwjk for (j, k) combinations
(for j ∈ c) with positive demand and let ν(2)c be taste shocks for (j, k) combinations (for j ∈ c)
with zero demand. As well as νwc equation (66) includes νwjk for j /∈ c and shopping cost shocks
νΓ. We group these together as ν(3) = ((νwjk)∀jk|j /∈c, νΓ). The full vector of taste shocks ν in (66) is
therefore
ν = (ν(1), ν(2), ν(3)). (68)
Let the joint density of these be f(ν(1), ν(2), ν(3)|θ).
The joint (discrete-continuous) likelihood that the consumer selects shopping choice c and
category choices (q, d) is given by integrating Pc(ν|θ)f(ν) over the range of ν that are consistent
with the consumer making a category choice (q, d) at c. This implies the restrictions for ν(1) and
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ν(2) that we derived in subsection G.3. The likelihood is therefore





Pc(ν¯(1), ν(2), ν(3)|θ)f(ν¯(1), ν(2), ν(3)|θ)abs[J ]dν(2)dν(3) (69)
where ν¯(1), abs[J ], and A(c, q, d) are defined as in section G.3. This likelihood resembles the
standard likelihood expression
∫
Pc(ν)f(ν)dν for a mixed logit model for the probability of discrete
choice c in the sense that we integrate the choice probability over the density for ν. The difference
is that we do not integrate over all possible values of ν: we fix some of them (namely ν(1)) to
the unique value (ν¯(1)) that is implied by utility maximization given non-zero observed category
demands and we restrict others (namely ν(2)) to the set of values A(c, q, d). Thus instead of
obtaining the probability for a discrete choice c we obtain the probability expression for the discrete-
continuous choice of (c, q, d). This likelihood extends those derived in the discrete-continuous
literature (Dubin and McFadden (1984), Haneman (1984), Smith (2004)) to the case of multiple-
continuous demands with corner solutions.
H Online Appendix: First-Order Condition for Prices
H.1 Profit maximization in terms of product prices
This subsection demonstrates that the first-order condition (50) can be derived from the assumption
of profit maximization at the level of product prices. Let pfh denote the price of product h in firm
f , where each product belongs to some category k.49 We express this as h ∈ k. The profit of firm
f is pif (p¯), where p¯ = (pfh)∀f,∀h, the vector of all product prices in all firms.
The usual first-order conditions for profit maximization by firm f are that
∂pif (p¯)
∂pfh
= 0 for all h. (70)
Suppose that we can aggregate the firm’s demand to the category level Qfk and to write it as
a function of category price indices pfk. Category price indices pfk are functions of the product
prices pfh so that we can write the function pfk(p¯fk) where p¯fk = (pfh)h∈k is the subvector of p¯
containing only the prices of products h ∈ k owned by f . Then profit can be written
pif (p¯) = ΣKk=1Qfk(p)(pfk −mcfk), (71)
where p = (pfk)∀f,∀k is the vector of category-specific price indices and mcfk is the marginal cost.
(To simplify the notation, we assume χf = 1 in this discussion. See Section 6.1.) Using (70) and
49Appendix C discusses the construction of price indices based on store-time specific product prices pjht. Since
we look at profit maximization at the weekly level, we suppress the t subscript in the current discussion.
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(71) we arrive at a first-order condition in terms of the category price index pfk:



















where the last line follows because Σh∈k ∂pfk(p¯fk)∂pfh 6= 0. Reintroducing χf , dividing by ∂Qfk/∂pfk
and pfk, and rearranging, we get (50).
H.2 Consumer Group Specific Price Indices
This subsection demonstrates that the first-order condition (50) holds when we allow price indices
to vary across consumer groups to reflect different purchasing patterns in households of different
size and social class. For simplicity we use the general case of i-subscripts which allows for price






where ∑h∈k wih = 1. To allow for a common shift to all product prices given by the scalar ρfk the




wih(pfh + ρfk) (74)




= 1 for all i. (75)
The i-specific category demands are Qifk(pi) where pi = (pifk)∀f,∀k is the vector of firm-category
price indices. Profit is
pif (p¯) = ΣiΣKk=1Qifk(pifk)(pifk −mcfk). (76)
As we saw in the previous subsection, profit maximization implies















































. Note that ∂pfk
∂ρfk





. Rearranging, reintroducing χf , and dividing by pfk, we get expression (50).
I Online Appendix: Profit Margin Calculations
In this Appendix we explain how we calculate the profit margin figures which are reported in
Table 8 We begin with the calculations using firm-level data covering all grocery categories and
then discuss the calculations using data specific to the the milk category which uses the same
method.
The Competition Commission (CC) reports two profit margin figures that we use to derive profit
margin estimates. The first figure is “gross retail margins” mr defined as the difference between
the retailer’s annual total revenue and its annual total wholesale cost divided by annual revenue
(using the supermarkets’ accounts). The CC reports gross retail margins in the range 0.24− 0.25
depending on firm (CC(2000) Table 8.19). The second figure is “gross manufacturer margins” mm
defined as the difference between manufacturer revenues and supplier operating costs (excluding
labor costs) as a proportion of manufacturer revenues. The CC reports gross manufacturer margins
of 0.25 and 0.36 depending on the sample of firms used (CC(2000) Paragraph 11.108 and CC(2008)
Appendix 9.3 Paragraph 11).
Let us begin by deriving a lower bound to the profit margins from these external data. To
do this we assume double marginalilzation, i.e. assume that all payments to manufacturers are
of the form of a marginal (or “linear”) wholesale price and the retailer optimizes against this
price plus its own marginal costs. Under this assumption the manufacturer’s marginal costs are
not relevant to the retailer when setting retail prices so that we can ignore the CC’s information
on the manufacturer’s margins. If linear prices are used in relations between supermarkets and
manufacturers (as double marginalization implies) then the gross retail margin mr is equivalent
to the retailers margin over wholesale prices. To obtain the lower bound to the profit margin
we combine (i) the assumption of double marginalization, with (ii) the assumption that all of
the retailer’s labour costs are marginal, and (iii) the lower end of the range of the figures (noted
above) from the CC for mr (i.e. 0.24). The CC reports that the ratio of labour costs to wholesale
price costs is 9:83 (see CC(2000), Paragraph 10.3) which implies labor costs are 983% = 10.8% of
wholesale costs. This implies we should adjust the retail gross margins reported above using the
formula m = 1−1.108(1−mr) which gives 0.16. This is the lower bound figure presented in Table
8.
Now we derive an upper bound to profit margins using the external data. To do this we
assume that there is efficient retail pricing so that the manufacturer’s marginal cost is relevant
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to the retailer when setting prices. To obtain an upper bound to margins we combine (i) the
assumption of efficient pricing, with (ii) the assumption that none of labour costs are marginal,
and (iii) the upper end of the range of figures (noted above) from the CC for both mr and mm.
With assumptions (i) and (ii) the overall vertical profit margin as a proportion of retail prices is
given by the formula m = mr + (1 −mr)mm where m is the overall margin, mr is retail margin
and mm is the manufacturer’s margin. Assumption (iii) is that we use the higher of the gross
margins figures from the CC for both retailers and manufacturers in this formula, i.s. mr = 0.25
and mm = 0.36. Together this gives the upper bound figure of m = 0.52 that appears in Table 8.
In the case of the milk category the CC reports gross retail margins in the range 0.28-0.30 and
gross manufacturer margins in the range 0.04-0.05 (see CC (2008) Appendix 9.3, Paragraphs 12
and 15). Using the same method as in the previous two paragraphs these figures imply margin
estimates for the milk category ranging from 0.20 (using m = 1− 1.108(1−mr) for mr = 0.28) to
0.34 (using m = mr + (1−mr)mm for mr = 0.30 and mm = 0.05).
The lower and upper bounds are conservative because it is likely that some intermediate pro-
portion of labour costs is marginal and because where the CC present a range of figures for gross
margins we have (under assumption (iii)) selected them to generate the widest bounds.
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J Online Appendix: Alternative Specifications
Table 13: Estimated Parameters: Alternative Specifications
Ind pjk Alt distij Alt Λkk′ Ind Λkk′
Est. Std. Er. Est. Std. Er. Est. Std. Er. Est. Std. Er.
A: Store-category Taste Effects
β01 2.228 0.194 2.181 0.080 2.195 0.236 2.252 0.055
β02 1.475 0.049 1.456 0.031 1.497 0.076 1.477 0.052
β03 1.129 0.040 1.125 0.014 1.000 0.023 1.215 0.032
β04 2.035 0.124 1.972 0.047 1.891 0.042 2.068 0.096
β05 2.783 0.208 2.731 0.152 2.823 0.131 2.863 0.226
β06 1.113 0.033 1.088 0.016 1.181 0.038 1.129 0.026
β07 2.359 0.133 2.617 0.113 2.419 0.127 2.566 0.099
β1 0.469 0.003 0.437 0.004 0.449 0.004 0.415 0.004
β2 0.450 0.011 0.482 0.011 0.472 0.018 0.469 0.013
Scale of Taste Shocks (ν):
σ1 0.188 0.032 0.320 0.018 0.213 0.030 0.197 0.039
σ2 0.977 0.022 1.046 0.027 0.894 0.033 0.973 0.026
σ3 0.580 0.016 0.731 0.026 0.579 0.037 0.751 0.039
σ4 1.186 0.023 1.091 0.024 1.096 0.029 1.077 0.020
σ5 – – – – – – 0.225 0.045
B: Second-Order Quadratic Parameters Λkk′
Λ11 22.254 6.828 21.116 3.305 20.153 3.019 21.542 2.248
Λ22 11.851 0.655 12.093 0.375 11.840 3.499 11.996 0.746
Λ33 3.919 0.286 4.035 0.182 3.601 0.198 4.330 0.218
Λ44 11.485 1.087 11.276 0.412 10.214 0.420 11.651 0.866
Λ55 16.851 2.558 16.808 1.164 16.554 1.060 17.219 2.049
Λ66 4.315 0.204 4.348 0.144 4.489 0.241 4.369 0.204
Λ77 9.105 0.902 10.677 0.674 9.127 0.792 10.094 0.653
Λ88 13.633 0.392 14.427 0.568 15.572 0.775 14.395 1.407
Λ57 1.879 0.121 2.032 0.081 – – 2.070 0.115
Λ18 1.558 0.083 1.444 0.182 – – 1.107 0.605
Λ23 0.286 2.473 0.201 0.681 – – 0.382 1.269
Λ23 0.394 1.709 0.870 0.998 – – 0.554 0.346
Λ23 0.061 1.030 0.113 0.152 – – 0.160 0.656
Λ14 – – – – 0.717 0.426 – –
Λ27 – – – – -0.033 1.213 – –
Λ38 – – – – -0.321 0.172 – –
λ1 – – – – – – 0.241 0.052
λ2 – – – – – – -0.033 0.062
C: Price Parameters
α1 1.759 0.056 1.908 0.021 1.938 0.033 1.967 0.043
α2 34.374 2.351 32.315 2.544 37.584 3.503 20.961 5.116
D: Shopping Costs
γ11 8.477 1.135 8.762 0.849 8.660 1.250 9.206 1.237
γ12 0.447 0.028 0.436 0.026 0.457 0.029 0.402 0.024
γ21 11.636 2.045 11.188 1.613 12.773 2.340 13.142 2.273
γ22 -0.386 0.031 0.385 0.029 0.422 0.032 0.366 0.028
Notes: Parameters are estimated using 6000 consumer-week observations. Standard errors are corrected
for simulation noise as detailed in Section 4. Time and firm-category fixed effects are not reported. The
specifications are described in subsection 6.6. 63
